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1. Introduction and the Description of Problem 
 
The aim of this paper is to show how the Finnish stock market performed during the 
Second World War. While the political establishment and contemporaries in general 
were not expecting that Finland would be dragged into escalating war in Europe, the 
stock market evidently reacted to Molotov–Ribbentrop pact and discounted increasing 
threat of war since the end of August 1939. The use of financial data, by observing 
stock market movements, can provide interesting perspective how contemporaries 
viewed the development of geopolitical crisis never seen before in this magnitude. Wars 
can be devastating for stock market. For the past century, there have been two world 
wars and numerous conflicts. Some of them, like the Cuban missile crisis, almost 
brought the whole world to the brink of extinction. One Great Depression and Great 
Recession look shy when juxtaposed next to these wars. Wars bring havoc to financial 
markets and war impact can be more powerful to stock market returns than recessions 
or financial shocks.1 Geopolitical crisis can have significant impact to stock market 
performance, consider just the more recent behaviour of the Finnish stock market during 
the Crimean annexation in 2014 or U.S. stock market behaviour in Iraq War 20032. 
War–time conditions is interesting focus point of curiosity for scientific inspection.  
 
This study could be viewed as a part of the growing family of studies that use financial 
data as a historical source, a topic which will be discussed with more detail below. In 
short, financial data captures the expectations and perceptions of contemporary agents. 
While historians do have the benefit of hindsight, they are exposed to the risk of 
narrative fallacy. That is, as Nassim Taleb put it, we humans have tendency to build 
explanations and logical links to sequences of facts even when there’s none, i.e. 
retrospective distortions.3 Hindsight is a double–edged sword: without its impossible to 
                                                 
1 See Ferguson 2008, pp. 431–477. For long time stock market performances, see for example 
Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2015 by Credit Suisse Research Institute and performance 
of German, Italian or even more dramatic Russian equity and bond markets. The Russian case is 
the most dramatic as the whole stock market was wiped out after the communist revolution 
demolished private ownership of capital.  
2 See Rigobon and Sack 2013.  
3 Taleb 2010, p. 7. Historians should be more than prepared to confront this problem as it is 
known for long, see for example Carr 1961. 
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build any sequential narrative about the past, or “write” history, but the same time we 
lose touch with the element of uncertainty and the nuances that contemporary real–life 
decision makers faced.  
 
To back up the historical reasoning which is based on stock market performance in this 
study, financial results of the Finnish companies listed in Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(from now on HSE) have been collected by the author. Using this data, a price–to–
earnings4 series for 1937–1947 is constructed, first of its kind in historical studies to 
illustrate the price level of the stock market. Historians have used bond prices in a 
similar fashion before.5 The anecdotal evidence about speculative booms of 1941 to 
1942 and 1945 are confirmed using this data when the P/E ratio skyrocketed, suggesting 
stocks were rising more than fundamental values of businesses would justify under any 
circumstances.6  
 
This paper asks four questions that are formulated as follows. 
 
i) How did the Finnish stock market develop during World War II? This paper 
gives a general picture how the HSE functioned as an institution and what 
kind of returns the Finnish stock market delivered during this period of 
crisis. A general narrative is provided in the analysis.  
ii) Did the Finnish stock market react to the heightened risk of war? The most 
interesting question is how the stock market performed before the war. Can 
German and, later, Soviet aggression be seen in how the stock market 
behaved? These sorts of questions have been asked from bond data that 
shows how investors believed the real value of government bonds perform 
under the stress, threat and presence of war. Considering recent stock market 
routes under similar domain of uncertainty such as the Ukrainian crisis of 
2014 or Iraq war in 2003, the question is valid indeed.  
                                                 
4 Price–to–earnings ratio is earnings multiple to describe the price level of the market. All the 
terms are explained below in chapter four.  
5 See, for example: Ferguson 2008. More studies inspected in Review of Literature chapter, see 
below.  
6 Fundamental value refers to a concept that companies do have a real, intrinsic value. Intrinsic 
value is the discounted value of all future cash flows or the value of holdings of that company 
has in its balance sheet: to sum up, fundamental value is the value that can be extracted from the 
company over its life time.  
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iii) What can the performance of the Finnish stock market tell about the 
expectations and perceptions of contemporary agents living in the middle of 
uncertainty? The use of financial data is valuable, since the biased hindsight 
cannot dilute the credibility of the data. 
iv) How the Finnish stock market performance relates to other stock markets 
during the turbulent period?7 
 
The questions are answered in the analysis chapter, but important background 
information is provided in the fourth chapter considering methodologies and material.  
As this paper shows, the stock market was affected by regulation, speculation, rising 
taxation and at the end of the war acted like a hedge against rising inflation, but 
insufficiently. The Bank of Finland financed the Continuation War partly by monetizing 
debt which affected the price level and thus impacted the real value of equities. Same 
debt monetizing did take its place in France and Germany and both had high inflation, 
too. This paper also sheds light how the rising price level affected the real value of the 
stock prices and shows that equities were not a good hedge against inflation.8   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two will provide a review of literature. Then, 
chapter three walks reader through the theoretical framework and discusses the 
problems about the efficient market hypothesis and how accurately the market data can 
be used as material for this paper. Chapter introducing methodological aspects and the 
material used follows, bringing theory and practice together. After this groundwork, the 
analysis puts all the knots together. Conclusions will be represented at the end of the 
paper. While it is recommended to read the paper from beginning to end as the narrative 
unfolds itself, for hasty reader, the introduction and conclusions will be sufficient to 
grasp a picture deep enough about the subject.  
 
The 1930’s marked a drift towards heightened ambitions of conquest and retaliation in 
nations ruled by populist governments, visioning a new world order. Most dramatic 
consequence of political contingency followed by the Great War was its sequence, the 
                                                 
7 Those markets being Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A. 
8 The effect of inflation to stocks is a long debated one. However, it seems that while expected 
inflation is in the short run irrelevant to real returns in stock market, in the long run high 
inflation and especially unexpected inflation causes negative effects to real return of the stock 
markets. See Lin 2009, pp. 783–795. 
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Second World War, called by Sir Winston Churchill “the unnecessary war”9, that 
caught fire in Europe by Autumn 1939. It was followed by the failure of France’s and 
Great Britain’s appeasement policy towards the belligerent and expansionist Germany.10 
Germany, eager to expand her Lebensraum and seeking retaliation after the defeat in the 
Great War and the humiliating chaos that followed, crusaded yet again on a great 
gamble against a formidable array of superior enemies, economically speaking. Time 
was against this endeavour. After successfully annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
Autumn 1939 marked the end of diplomatic triumphs for the Nazi Regime that then 
continued its aggressive pursuit by means of brunt force.11 The Molotov–Ribbentrop –
Pact unchained the Third Reich from the risk of two–front war and divided Eastern 
Europe, including Finland, under German and Soviet spheres of influence. Finland was 
to become part of Soviet Union that consequently started to demand territory and 
military bases from Finland. The government of Finland rejected these proposals. In the 
following Winter War 30.11–1939–13.3.1940 Finland fought against Soviet invasion 
and in the end seceded some of her territory to Soviet Union.12 
 
Immediately after the declaration of peace, Prime Minister Ryti stated in his speech to 
Parliament that reconstruction would take place with “sword in the other hand and 
turner in the other”.13 Finland soon aligned herself with Germany and fought Soviet 
Union the Continuation War, from 25.6.1941 till 19.9.1944 in an aim to regain the lost 
territories in the Winter War. The war was lost and the Finnish Army was pushed out 
from the Soviet Union. Finland had to cut the ties with Germany and the German 
military retreated from Lapland. Finland had to pay heavy war reparations to Soviet 
Union and after the war diplomatically balanced herself between the Western and 
Eastern camps of the Cold War.14 
 
The war caused severe stress to Finnish economy. State officials had to cope with 
expensive war by taking more responsibility to run the economy. War production rose 
six–fold from 1938 to 1944. Defence spending took a lion’s share of the government 
                                                 
9 Churchill 1954, p. x.  
10 Sir Hart 1968.  
11 See Tooze 2006, p. 285–326.  
12 Kirby 2006, p. 197–198. 
13 Meinander 2006, p. 180–190. 
14 Kirby 2006, p. 220–230. 
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budget. Finland’s ability to feed her army and people in the Continuation War was 
heavily subsidized by Germany. Regulation was strict but black market flourished.15 
 
The War affected Helsinki Stock Exchange in many ways too. The exchange was closed 
for few days after the German invasion in Poland started Poland in September 1939. 
Stock trading was suspended after belligerent actions from Soviet Union  
10.10–22.11.1939. During the Winter War the whole exchange was closed until 
1.4.1940 when it was reopened and stayed that way for rest of the war.16 Next, this 
paper gives reader a review of previous studies and studies concerned in explaining 
stock market movements. 
 
 
2. Review of Literature 
 
This chapter inspects the literature and studies concerned with the problems introduced 
above. There are no explicit studies concerned how the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
reacted to war, but many studies have the same method of using financial data as 
material for historical inquiry. Wars have frequently affected equity markets, sometimes 
in a fundamental way as tens of years of market returns were erased and hard–earned 
savings are destroyed by galloping inflation. Review of Literature serves as prologue to 
the theoretical framework conversation following in the third chapter.  
 
2.1. Research Context: Asset Prices as a Historical Source 
 
One of the first research papers, where historical asset prices were used as a basic 
source of material rather than conventional letters, diaries or verbal statements, studied 
the behaviour of the Greenback during the U.S. Civil War. Starting in 1862, United 
States issued an inconvertible currency called the Greenback to bolster the Union 
government budget constrained by the expensive civil war against the rebellious 
Confederate States. People hoped that after the war, Greenbacks could be converted 
                                                 
15 Meinander 2009, p. 109–118. 
16 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 78. 
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back to gold dollars in one–for–one ratio. As the Greenback was guaranteed only by the 
U.S. government and had no intrinsic value per se, its price in terms of gold was 
effectively “a running commentary on the Union’s fortunes, as perceived by participants 
in financial markets.”17   
 
This approach has some prominent advantages. Instead of listing important turning 
points a priori and testing their importance, the study allowed the data itself to identify 
important dates. Some events overlooked by historians were regarded important by 
contemporaries and vice versa, if price actions are to be believed.18  
 
The link between the Greenback and the progress of Civil War was quite pronounced as 
the Greenbacks existence was explicitly bound to the fate of the Union. The same 
shared destiny can be found with government bonds. Frey and Kucher observed the 
value change of national government bonds issued in Swiss Francs that traded on the 
Swiss bourse for the period 1933–1946. As above, they point out the advantages with 
capital market data. The data reflects all the available information, and more 
importantly, all the expectations at any given point of time. Thus, future insights are 
removed. As written above, the element of uncertainty is incorporated in the data while 
of course the real decision making process agents went through is still hiding in the 
shadows. Agents in financial markets should have strong incentives to carefully 
evaluate the situation as the future of their finances are directly affected19, “putting their 
money where their mouths are”, as the idiom goes. They also remark that financial 
markets usually possess high predictive power due to so–called marginal traders.20  
 
The econometric method Frey and Kucher applied searched for structural breaks in the 
series of bond prices. A four–step procedure determined which periods to look at and 
test for statistically significant structured breaks within each of the windows isolated. 
                                                 
17 Willard, Guinnane and Rosen 1995, p. 3. 
18 On the efficiency of the market to incorporate all the news to prices, see discussion below. 
The problem is also highlighted in the above–mentioned study, see p. 6–8. Evidence shows that 
the postulate that gold traders were informed holds and the market was efficient enough. 
19 Frey and Kucher 2000, p. 188.  
20 The Marginal Trader Hypothesis, or MTH postulates, that despite the inclusion of poorly 
informed or market–ignorant participants, a small part of the trader population, but equipped 
with superior market intellect or information, will steer the market price to efficient levels as a 
by–product of exploiting mispricing. See Blackwell and McManus 2011, p. 1–2.  
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Only one event, the “official” outbreak of the Second World War, produced statistically 
significant break points in all five countries.  Observed raw data showed that German 
government bonds fell towards the end of 1939 and rose back after the successful so–
called Blitzkrieg campaign in the West. From the second half of 1941 they started a 
permanent fall, suggesting bond markets anticipated a loss for Axis cause, especially 
after the invasion of Normandy in 1944.21  
 
Frey has produced another research paper with Waldenström, focusing on the 
government bonds of Nordic Countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. They 
recall that according to conventional Nordic historiography, there was only few if any in 
these countries who believed in the increased threat of war.22 The case for studying 
bond prices is strengthened here: Frey and Waldenström argue that war imposes 
extraordinary pressure on fiscal balances, hence increased sovereign risk or higher 
yields on traded debt, respectively.23 Thinking over the history of public debt, the 
argument could be said to be relevant.24  Comparing the two empirical methodologies, 
historical writing and econometric measuring of large shifts in asset prices, Frey and 
Waldenström discovered disagreements in several instances. For example, while 
historians claim that Nordic people felt safe until Autumn of 1939 in case of Finland or 
early April 1940 in case of Denmark and Norway, the prices of bonds in fell 
considerably several months before these ex–post conjectured dates. In other instances, 
market data and historical writing complements each other.25  
 
2.2. Research Context: Asset prices and News  
 
In above studies, asset prices were used to identify important events as contemporaries 
viewed them during war, compared to what historians have figured out as turning points 
ex–post. How about the relationship between asset prices and news? Do asset prices 
react to news and if they do so, how strong should this reaction be? This should be an 
interesting question in a sense that while financial markets should evaluate and discount 
                                                 
21 Frey and Kucher 2000, p. 189–191. 
22 Frey and Waldenström 2006, p. 5–7. 
23 Frey and Waldenström 2006, p. 3.  
24 See Reinhart and Rogoff 2009.  
25 Frey and Waldenström 2006, p. 18. 
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all the possible information to prices of securities trading in the present, including long 
term trends, how much do short term news affect them? As we will see, it seems that 
investors gauge information and incorporate it into asset prices incrementally, thus 
making the picture blurry about how individual news affect prices in the long run.  
 
One of the first studies where the relationship between news and asset prices were 
studied was Niederhoffer’s “The Analysis of World Events and Stock Prices”. The 
study picked news about world events that appeared in New York Times headlines. The 
problem with this method is of course that some events could have gone unnoticed in 
news sources until picked up later by public or that the reaction of markets could have 
influenced which news were picked to headlines in the first place.26 News were then 
assorted to seven categories from “extremely good” to “extremely bad” and the study 
observed movements in the general stock market index in the five days immediately 
following the world events. Research paper notes that it could take weeks or even years 
for the full influence of the events, and the compounding effect of other news makes the 
picture blur in the longer period. The study found that there was a strong tendency for 
good headlines to follow good and bad headlines to follow bad.27 During crisis, in this 
case burst of world events, 42% of the daily changes were big. World events did affect 
stock prices in a discernible way as there was a greater number of large changes than 
would be expected by chance.28 Nevertheless, in the concluding remarks Niederhoffer 
holds that the studies stance towards random walk hypothesis is neutral, that is, it would 
be extremely difficult to make predictions or earn financial gain based on these 
headlines.29 This paper discusses the efficient market hypothesis later on in chapter 
three.  
 
A similar study with a goal to find relevant news and see what fraction of price 
movements news could explain studied the bond prices in United Kingdom 1900–
1920.30 Consistently with previous studies31, the study found that while news on 
                                                 
26 Niederhoffer 1971, pp. 193–219. 
27 Ibid. 1971, p. 202. 
28 Ibid. 1971, p. 205. 
29 Ibid. 1971, p. 215.  
30 Elmendorf, Hirschfeld and Weil 1996, p. 341–344.   
31 The most illustrative example is the crash of 1987 without any news of obvious importance. 
Onn news media and stock market behaviour, see Shiller 2005, p. 90–103 or Shiller 1987.  
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important events definitely affect asset prices, news explain only a small part of price 
variability.32 This phenomenon is also discovered in as different asset class as orange 
juice concentrate, Roll’s study on orange juice concentrate future prices addressed the 
same point: OJ futures market is inefficient due to imposed limits on price movements, 
which renders away the predictive power of the most obvious factor, the weather. But, 
“yet no factor was identified that can explain more than a small part of the daily price 
movement in orange juice futures. There is a large amount of inexplicable price 
volatility.”33   
 
Unsurprisingly, the lack of explanation power of news on asset prices has given demand 
for theories that explain movements without news. For most economists who try to seek 
rational causes for market behaviour, irrational “fads” and “bubbles” seem unsatisfying 
and unscientific explanations. Romer strikes in the middle ground that the market 
movements can be rational even without news affecting the fundamentals as investors 
and analyst assessment of them is incremental but not instant process and trading only 
gradually conveys information about the investors updated future expectations.34 De 
Long et al. argue that so–called noise traders, acting on noise as if it were information, 
could affect market prices on the short term when their better informed colleagues see 
the risk and reward ratio too low for arbitrage, adding explanation to  movements 
without news.35 
 
2.3. Markets Under Siege: The Stock Market and War 
 
There is an absence of explicit studies on Finnish Stock Market during the Second 
World War. Most studies regarding the stock market are occupied with overall market 
performance36, equity premium which requires long time series of historical returns to 
reduce estimation error37 and testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis38 to mention a 
                                                 
32 Elmendorf et al. 1996, p. 344.  
33 Roll 1984, p. 879. 
34 Romer 1993, p. 1129. 
35 See De Long, Schleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1990, pp. 703–738.  
36 For studies about long term index performance and stock market index constructing, earlier 
period 1912–1929 see Poutvaara 1996. 
37 Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2011.  
38 See for example Sierimo 2002. 
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few39, but those are subjects inside the realm of economics. Nyberg and Vaihekoski 
briefly mention that the Finnish stock market “was heavily affected by the Second 
World War”, that the decade of the 1940’s was “characterized by a high level of 
inflation”40 and “(the war) appears to have been devastating for the stock market” as the 
real equity values shrank to 36% at the end of decade compared to values in the 
beginning.41 Tiderman, in his brief historical review of Helsinki Stock Exchange during 
1937–1962, mentions the Second World War from very general point of view, mostly 
describing how the stock market moved and how investors tried to escape inflation after 
the war.42  
 
An interesting study by Palmgren (and also quite unique, there’s not much studies from 
a common investor perspective, as noted by the study)  tries to calculate what were the 
stock returns for common investor for the 30 year period 1926–1956. The period is 
chosen on the basis that it is a long enough time span to include many economic cycles 
and conditions, thus giving credibility for the long term stock market performance 
observation. The study is heavily tilted towards a common saver experience and focuses 
on the 13 stocks that comprised the UNITAS index. The study is concerned by the same 
questions about dividends, share issues and the value change of the currency as 
Vaihekoski’s and Nyberg’s papers were. He mentions the post–war inflation as a 
remarkable driver to transfer savings from bank accounts to stocks, but still the activity 
of stock investing is muted, he concludes. Especially industrial stocks’ returns were 
good, from 0 to 11.6% per annum (the best stock for the period being Wärtsilä, the 
worst, Finska Socker). For banking stocks the real return was deep below the water 
mark. The actual war period is mentioned from the inflation and the war economy 
perspective, but leaves much in the shadows.43 
 
The war period is also commented by Stjernschantz, but mainly from the institutional 
point of view. On the other hand, Stjernschantz provides important qualitative remarks 
for this paper about the development of the stock market and investor moods of the time 
                                                 
39 For overall stock market behaviour, see also earlier study by Kallunki, Martikainen, 
Martikainen and Yli–Olli 1997, p. 474–495.  
40 Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2011, p. 10. 
41 Ibid. 2011, p. 29.  
42 See Tiderman 1962.  
43 See Palmgren 1958, pp. 50–65.  
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period. The stock market played a walk–on rôle in the Finnish war economy but had its 
portion of negative attention from the government. Inflation rose as war expenditures 
were increasingly financed with the money printed by the Bank of Finland. In the same 
time the quantity of available goods in the market was reduced. Savers looked for safe 
havens, allocating their inflation sensitive savings to real values that had some hard 
assets behind them, such as shares of industrial companies. The government tried to turn 
the money flow to finance war expenditures and intervened the stock market in many 
ways as we will see below.44 Kantanen has comments on the war time or how it affected 
different company shares and businesses. For example, in 1942 the Finnish government 
requested for 13 new companies to be listed in the stock exchange to increase supply of 
shares and contain rising share prices, a subject we will return later.45  
 
In other words, there is room for deeper inquiry of the period. It seems that the Finnish 
experience was quite similar compared to that of France as we will see below. France 
experienced a massive inflation due to printing of new currency that flew into 
circulation and ballooning asset prices eventually collapsed when the quest for safety 
was subdued at the end of the war.  
 
Generations of thinkers from Montesquieu to Keynes have reiterated that wars disrupt 
trade and are generally harmful for the economy.46 Wars can have a calamitous effect 
on the stock market: compared to one Great Depression and a number of smaller 
financial crisis, there have been two world wars and the Cold War, after all. Barro and 
Ursúa have studied long–term data for 30 countries up to 2006. Among the 232 
discovered stock market crashes (defined as multi–year returns of -25% or less), 71 
matched with depressions (defined as multi–year declines in consumption or GDP of  
-10% or less) and 29 (41%) of those were associated with war.47 Rising political 
uncertainty and declining economic output levels seems to increase volatility in the 
markets.48 
                                                 
44 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 78–83. 
45 See Kantanen 2012. 
46 Schneider and Troeger 2006, pp. 623–645. 
47 Barro and Ursúa 2009, p. 40.  
48 Bittlingmayer 1998, pp. 2243–2257, p. 2246. 
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Ferguson has studied financial markets under war conditions and argues that the First 
World War was a “bolt from the blue”49, causing financial crisis that caught investors 
unprepared. Trading was closed in global stock markets for five months, the first time 
for London Stock Exchange ever.50  
 
If almost no one could believe that the Great War would ever materialize51, the Second 
World War was not a total surprise for the City nor financial markets in general.52 
Ferguson argues that history was not a helpful guide to navigate through the financial, 
as equity performance differed vastly from the First World War. To mention one 
example, in the United Kingdom the equity returns in real terms were poor in WWI, but 
beat all the other markets in the WWII.53 Studies on more recent conflicts like the Gulf 
War support the same conjecture: most often conflicts are bad for stock markets as 
difficult–to–measure uncertainty rises but occasional “war rallies” can also present 
themselves.54 Sometimes it seems that markets are almost indifferent to geopolitical 
crisis, as the stock market reaction to Cuban missile crisis showed. The market reaction 
was minimal, which is somewhat surprising given that the future of the whole 
humankind was at stake, even though the public was not well–informed and did not 
know how close the conflict was about to turn Cold War into a hot one.55  
 
As implied above, interestingly the experience of French equities during the Second 
World War resembles the performance of Finnish equities. Le Bris has studied the 
performance of equities in the Franco–Prussian War and during the both World Wars. 
France was conquered in a quick manner by the advancing Wehrmacht and put under 
German occupation for four years. Banque de France created new money without equal 
creation of wealth to finance war expenditures. Germany forced the French government 
to pay indemnity and the costs of occupation, causing massive expansion of money 
supply and surging inflation. 
 
                                                 
49 An idiom often used indeed, see Roberts 2013, p. 22–39.  
50 The event quite exceptional when taking into consideration that this was the first closure ever 
in London Stock Exchange, established 1773.  
51 See MacMillan 2013. 
52 Ferguson 2008, p. 462.  
53 Ibid. 2008, p. 440.  
54 Schneider and Troeger 2006, p. 642–643. 
55 Ferguson 2008, p. 470.  
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During the period, all assets were controlled and cross border money flow was 
prevented. Price controls were imposed on goods. Thus, money could only buy national 
assets. All free prices rose and stocks that had hard assets backing them rose the most. 
By 1943, the end for this exceptional situation appeared on the horizon as Germanys 
fortunes turned around; the upward movement in stock prices reverted itself. Le Bris 
argues that the method how war was financed affected how equities performed. During 
the Second World War, rampaging inflation purged savers as real equity values dropped 
almost 90% from January 1939 till January 1949.56  
 
In another paper, Le Bris divided the French Stock Index CAC 40 to two different sub–
indexes: “Military Providers” and all the others. The study did not find any difference in 
returns between the two indexes, even though it is plausible to assume that equities of 
the Military Providers should outperform others. The problem is that none of the 
companies in the Military Providers was a pure–player in weapons industry and many 
steel industries were located near the German border.57 This same sort of comparison 
between industries is presented in this study as well. 
 
In French experience, stocks could not match inflation and eventually proved to be 
inadequate hedge against the rising price levels. The effect of inflation to stocks is a 
long debated one. However, it seems that while expected inflation is in the short run 
irrelevant to real returns in stock market, in the long run high inflation and especially 
unexpected inflation causes negative effects to real return of the stock markets.58 Also 
the German Stock Market was decimated during the war because of practically stalled 
trading and the collapse of the currency.59 Inflation hurt savers, but the devaluation of 
the currency must have added to their woes. The Finnish Markka was also devalued 
multiple times during 1945–1947, which could have pushed security prices further 
down. However, it is plausible to assume that the effect of devaluations was limited 
since the number of foreign stock holders must have been very limited, if non–existent, 
                                                 
56 Le Bris 2008, p. 4–10. Accessed 3.12.2016 http://www.keynes.dk/fresh/3/le_bris.pdf. The 
French equity returns matched the ones in Finland that also lost around 90% of their value 
during this period.  
57 Le Bris 2012, pp. 337–361, p. 6–9.  
58 Lin 2009, pp. 783–795. 
59 Ferguson 2008, p. 39–41. 
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during this turbulent and protectionist period under question. Besides, devaluation props 
export oriented companies.60 
As a side note, it seems that under German boot, also the art market experienced boom–
and–bust–styled pattern as art was supposed to be an inflation hedge too.61 
 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Critical to this thesis is the postulate that markets are somewhat efficient: they do 
incorporate all the available information affecting fundamentals of companies into the 
share price. Prices are nodes of information, in the sense of Hayekian tradition.62 Thus, 
at any given point of time, the price of the share is the sum of all reflections: rational, 
calculated expectations about future development and therefore the behaviour of 
investors is logical. As written above, in this paper the stock market is used as a 
historical source with the conjecture that the market reflects developments in the outside 
world.  If markets were inefficient, or irrational, the reliability of price actions as a 
historical source could be questioned. Therefore, the assumption about market 
rationality and efficiency is the key of this research. This chapter walk through the 
theoretical framework of this paper, bringing the theory to context of the historical 
inquiry and discussing the problems and limitations of the theory.  
 
3.1. Equity Investing in theory 
 
Essentially, changes in stock prices are driven by supply and demand. If there is more 
demand than supply, then stock price appreciates and vice versa. Price is what investors 
pay and value is what they get.63 If an investor believes stock X will be a good 
investment, she should buy it, thus being “long” in the market until she believes the 
market is going to reverse its direction and decline. If she believes the market is going 
                                                 
60 See Patro, Wald and Wu 2014, pp. 79–94. 
61 David and Oosterlinck 2012, p. 19–20.  
62 See Hayek 1945, p. 519–530.  
63 This very illustrative point was made by Ben Graham and cited by Warren Buffett in his 2008 
letter to shareholders. Source: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 2008 Annual Report. This point also 
suggest that share prices tend to differ from their fundamental values from time to time. 
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down the investor should stay away from the market or “short” the stock. That is, 
borrow the stock and sell it later on with cheaper price and get the difference minus 
expenses to herself.64 The next logical step to the investor is to try to analyse the value 
of the stock. According to the efficient market present–value model stock markets 
reflect revisions in expected future cash flows or discount rates. Expected cash flows 
are then paid to investors as dividends. Thus, stock prices could be explained by the 
future dividend income they create. Heuristically this is modelled by the traditional 
Gordon valuation model:  
Pt = Dt / (r-gt), 
where Pt is the price, Dt is the current dividend and the constant r is the real required 
dividend. The “permanent” dividend growth rate gt is unknown, thus investors are 
required to re–estimate it from time to time when new information arrive that could 
change calculations of the future income stream.65 In a nutshell, share price is 
equivalent of the discounted sum of all the future dividends.  
 
3.2. The Efficient Market Hypothesis: A Walkthrough  
 
One of the first books advocating more scientific inquiry into the stock valuation 
process was Irving Fisher’s The Nature of Capital and Income, published in 1906. As 
the preface states, the “book is an attempt to put on a rational foundation the concepts 
and fundamental theorems of capital and income”.66 The attempt was not unique: the 
same spirit can be seen in Louis Bachelier’s thesis Theory of Speculation.  The opening 
paragraph is revealing: 
 
The influences which determine the movements of the Stock Exchange are 
innumerable. Events past, present or even anticipated, often showing no 
apparent connection with its fluctuations, yet have repercussions on its course. 
Beside fluctuations from, as it were, natural causes, artificial causes are also 
involved. The Stock Exchange acts upon itself and its current movement is a 
function not only of earlier fluctuations, but also of the present market position. 
The determination of these fluctuations is subject to an infinite number of 
                                                 
64 Sornette 2003, p. 33. 
65 See Gordon 1962, p. 37–51.  
66 Fisher 1906, p. Vii. 
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factors: it is therefore impossible to expect a mathematically exact forecast. 
Contradictory opinions in regard to these fluctuations are so divided that at the 
same instant buyers believe the market is rising and sellers that it is falling.67 
 
Between the lines, the concept of random walk is visible. Random walk is the other side 
of the coin for efficient market hypothesis: if markets were efficient, there should not be 
large price distortions from the fundamental values to take advantage of. Price 
movements are independent, thus the future price movements cannot be predicted based 
on the price actions of the past.68  
 
As Fama postulates in his famous research paper, the random walk essentially states 
that over the long term, it should be impossible for investors to beat the market, ie. 
make more money by picking individual stocks compared to buying the whole index 
where all the stocks are represented.69 But to claim markets to be efficient, we are 
required to consider what kind of features the market should possess. First, in an ideal 
market place there would be no transactions costs. Secondly, all the information should 
be available to all agents operating in the market without costs. Thirdly, all agree with 
the implications of news to current price and distribution of future prices of each 
security.70 As the above case with oranges showed, the ideal market is seldom the 
condition of reality. 
 
3.3. Limitations of the theory and the reflexivity of the market 
 
The efficient market has had lot of critique since its inception.71 However, it is not the 
main purpose of this paper to consider economic theory. Only the most relevant points 
are considered. For example, many studies claim that psychological factors play their 
part, underlining the fact that humans as economic agents are not capable of constantly 
rational behaviour.72 A Study by Hirshleifer and Shumway found that sunshine is highly 
                                                 
67 Bachelier 1900, p. 21. Translated to English by D. May.  
68 Efficient markets hypothesis is famously promoted in Malkiel 2012. 
69 Fama 1970, p. 414–416.  
70 Fama 1970, p. 387. 
71 Representing the most usual critique, see Malkiel 2003, pp. 59–82. 
72 Humans seems lack capacity to be rational calculating agents all the time. See for example 
Kahneman 2011. 
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significantly correlated with daily stock returns. A trader without transaction costs could 
have improved his or her risk–adjusted returns in market portfolio (called Sharpe ratio 
in economics), but transaction costs eliminated this advantage. The sunshine effect is 
hard to reconcile with fully rational price formation in the market.73 At least in the short 
term, market seems more like a voting machine (only money, no intelligence nor skill is 
required), vulnerable to irrationality, rather than rational weighting machine, to use 
Benjamim Graham’s phrase liberally.74  
 
And, if the market were efficient, who would have the incentive to trade since there 
could be no chance for excess returns. Being smarter than the market brings no 
advantage nor is being stupid a disadvantage. There must be some inefficiency in the 
market to make trading possible and compensate for the cost of information.75 Equity 
prices have higher volatility than suggested by the volatility of the present value of 
dividends paid ex–post.76 Shiller and Campbell have pointed out that higher P/E ratio 
forecasts lower future returns, contradicting the non–predictability of the random 
walk.77  
 
The stock market is a place mainly for practice under the domain of risk taking (reward 
in mind) and less for theory. Then it could be argued that practitioners have their word 
as well. From the practitioner’s side, the famous trader George Soros claims that our 
perception of the world is bound to be biased, inconsistent, or both. Hence, we are 
fallible. Then add to this the notion of reflexivity. For example, if investors believe that 
the market is efficient, they will change their investing style in concert with this 
perception, which will in turn change the nature of market. The market is not a static 
objective to be observed objectively but it is also reflecting like a mirror, forming a 
feedback loop on how market participants rationalize the market in their thinking and 
action. Knowledge and action are not independent. While the principle of fallibility is a 
sort of no–brainer, with the principle of reflexivity it corrodes the efficient market 
hypothesis. Soros sees that the market equilibrium, where the market participant’s 
                                                 
73 Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003, p. 1028.  
74 See Berkshire Hathaway 1993 Shareholder letter 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1993.html. Accessed 15.1.2017.  
75 See Grossman and Stiglitz 1980, p. 393–408.  
76 Robert, De Long: 1993, p. 291–311, p. 291–293. See also Shiller 1980. 
77 Shiller 2005, p. 186.  
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perception of the market corresponds the objective reality, is an exceptional or extreme 
situation and the fundamental feature of the market is to levitate away from equilibrium. 
According to Soros, the fundamental nature of the market is dynamic dis–equilibrium.78 
While lacking academic support for his theory, formulating market dynamics this way 
in practice has been quite lucrative for Soros himself.  
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis does not postulate that efficient market is always right. 
But if one’s intellectual stance is that the market is efficient, its very short leap to frame 
it as being right all the time as well, which could lead to dangerous situations in 
investing.  If stocks are highly priced, one could think the market is rationally expecting 
growth in profits and is correct in anticipating it when as a matter of fact, risks are 
elevated in high–multiple environment. Empirically, high earning multiples are usually 
followed by low or negative multi–year returns and low multiples are followed by high 
multi–year returns.79  
 
It is notable that many market commentators dislike the theory. Barton Biggs slashed 
that “just as a stock doesn’t know or care that you own it, the market doesn’t know 
you’ve written an equation for it”.80 Arguably the most successful investor in the world, 
Warren Buffett, argues in his famous The Super–investors of Graham–Doddsville that 
many successful investor tend to come from a certain branch of (value) investing, 
suggesting that certain investing strategies lead to alpha81 consistently which is 
impossible in the world of the efficient market hypothesis.82 As historian Barbara 
Tuchman eloquently put it, “You cannot extrapolate any series in which the human 
element intrudes; history, that is, the human narrative, never follows, and will always 
fool, the scientific curve.”83 
 
                                                 
78 See Soros 2008, p. 25–78. 
79 See Diagram in Shiller 2005, p. 186–187. See also Campbell and Shiller 2001, p. 25–26. High 
P/E ratios forecasting lower returns on equities is an effect that should not exist in the 
theoretical world of the Efficient Market Hypothesis.   
80 Biggs 2014, p. 92.  
81 Alpha refers to market returns above the similar market portfolios with less risks, risk in this 
case defined as volatility compared to general market. 
82 Buffett, Warren: The Superinvestors of Graham–Doddsville as in Graham 2006, p. 537–560. 
83 Biggs 2014, p. 2. 
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To sum up, the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a theory is most of the time true with 
many caveats. It has limits and it is intellectually untenable to take it literally. Indeed, it 
is dangerous to give too much confidence to prices: they are the sum of estimates by 
fallible human beings who are inclined to herd behaviour, overconfidence, have 
institutional rules that impose limits on trading etc. The key takeaway, however, is that 
beating the market in the long run, while possible, is certainly very hard feat to 
accomplish. This suggests markets tend to be efficient most of the time.84 While it’s 
clear that the theory has fundamental flaws, in this study the assumption is made that 
the market is somewhat efficient and the price actions of the past can bring us insights 
on how contemporaries viewed the events evolving around them. This topic is brought 
to practice in the next chapter.  
 
 
4. Methodologies and material 
 
The methodology of this study could be described as “financial archaeology”: with 
financial data, we try to get hints from the past.85 This chapter explains the methods 
utilized and walks the reader through the material. All the terms will be profoundly 
explained. We will also touch the crucial question: was the market efficient enough to 
draw any conclusions about the market movements in the 1930’s and –40’s? The 
methodology to use the stock market as a data source to see the turning points of war 
can be questioned, since share prices should reflect the fundamentals of the company, 
not overall macro picture unless it has direct effect on the company itself. This topic 
will be dealt with in this chapter as well. A coherent picture of the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange during the time period will constructed. After this the actual analysis section 
shall follow.  
 
 
 
                                                 
84 See Shiller 2005, p. 177–194. 
85As humorously put in Jorion and Goetzmann 1999, p. 978. 
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4.1. Methods: Financial Archaeology   
 
The main method of this study is a descriptive analysis backed up with statistical 
financial data. The idea is to construct a narrative about the development of the Finnish 
stock market, based on the stock index data. Because of the relatively short time frame, 
more complex statistical methods don’t fit for the purpose. The idea of the descriptive 
analysis is to describe, in a non–normative way, the object under focus.86 By observing 
price movements, thinking and perception of contemporary agents are discovered in the 
very same spirit as in the studies reviewed above in chapter two.  This approach has 
advantages as shown above, but nevertheless it will be subjected to a critical evaluation 
below. Stock quotes are reliable, of course, but the efficiency of their formation is the 
crucial question that is touched below as well. It seems that this is the very first 
historical study to use earning–multiple ratios to back up reasoning.87 Price–to–earnings 
multiple is used in the analysis section to judge whether the market was over–priced or 
were the pricing of stocks reasonable at all. This reasoning is derived from the 
viewpoint that stock movements themselves are just one side of the coin, unlike in 
bonds where the fundamental value is reflecting the credit worthiness of the state or 
whoever is selling them. This topic is discussed in detail below, but for now it can be 
said that by observing changes in earnings multiples a historian can tell if the market 
was rising because of rising earnings or just rising earnings multiples, echoing the 
investors reduced appetite for a compensation of risks.  
 
4.1.1. The Stock Market as a Tool to Discover Past 
 
Can stock market be used as a tool to evaluate how the war progressed? As has been 
shown above, many studies use bond market as a useful source to shed light on 
contemporaries thinking and expectations about the path of war. But the link between 
bonds and governments is straightforward: the more the government, via a central bank, 
is printing money to finance war expenditures, the less is the present value of bonds in 
the eyes of investors. If the state is in danger of losing the war, it is very plausible to 
assume that the reimbursement of bonds is very uncertain. If the government disappears 
                                                 
86 See Anttila 2006, p. 285–286.  
87 Author has not run into any other historical studies using P/E ratios in stock market studies, 
but bond prices (yields) have been more common in this field. 
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totally, chances of getting any value from the bonds drops to zero even though there 
might be some wishful traders for some time around, hoping to recover some as in the 
case of Tsarist bonds in the Paris bourse after the Soviets repudiated all bonds.88 
 
The question is more complicated with the stock market that contains individual 
companies that are capable of reaction, transformation, change and respond to different 
shocks and events depending on their business, fundamentals and so on. Basically, the 
stock market is the aggregate of all the securities traded in it. Each security is 
representing a share of business operating in the real world, but still the individual 
shares can levitate far from fundamentals, if the market is not efficient. Indeed, one has 
many moving parts and levels to consider: macro and geopolitical events affect 
individual companies whose business value are weighted in the stock market every day 
(when the market is open, of course). But these same events affect trading, judgment 
and expectations of share movements themselves as well. Are investors selling because 
event X is affecting their companies and the perception of a present value of a company 
is changed, or do they sell because they need cash for other purposes and needs 
emerging from the event? Or, are they selling because they anticipate others to sell? The 
market movement up or down, an aggregate of all agency actions, is never transparent 
when it comes to true motives behind trade. One tends to rationalize it afterwards, as is 
the way how humans function.  
 
These questions are relevant to ask as it is imperative to highlight that the link between 
war events and stock prices can be problematic. As noted above, equities were not only 
expectations of future cash flows, hence long term investments, but safe havens from 
inflation or the only place to park one’s savings in a very restricted, closed economic 
environment. However, it is important to remind that Finland was involved in a conflict 
with a planned economy where there was no room for private businesses. Therefore, 
should Finland have lost the war unconditionally, followed by occupation, the value of 
businesses should have been zero for investors. Certainly, that was not the case, even 
though their value was much less after the lost war than before it. For example, the 
                                                 
88 See Oosterlinck 2006. 
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German defeat in 1945 was also an end to many of her businesses, the most infamous 
being the German conglomerate IG Farben that was liquidated after the war.89  
A conclusion can be made that the stock market could be used as a running commentary 
on war as well as individual company fortunes.  
 
4.2. About the Stock Index and the Daily Index 
 
The stock index used in this study is the back bone of the descriptive analysis. This 
study uses the index constructed by Nyberg and Vaihekoski. The Nyberg–Vaihekoski 
index is a total return, all–share value–weighted index. The data is monthly in its 
frequency, capturing the month–end status of the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  The index 
includes shares and preferred shares and was built for the years 1912–1970. The data is 
split–adjusted and dividends are included.90  
 
Their main source was Mercator newspaper that had stock quotes provided by the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange. The second source was Kock webpages where listing and de–
listing dates for companies can be found. Month–end bid price was collected from 
Mercator for every company in the data. If the bid price was not available at the month–
end, then it was traced form the last available intra–month quote. Some manual 
corrections had to be made. It is also noteworthy that many shares were de–listed and 
re–listed during the time–period. During the Winter war HSE was closed so quotes from 
December 1939 till February 1940 are missing and zero returns were assumed in the 
index.91 
 
To create value–weighted index the number of stocks for each share had to be collected 
from the so–called Ironbook (which is reinforced with iron covers, hence the name). 
Book equity capital was collected from the book as well. Dividends are assumed to be 
re–invested and taxes ignored which is very critical information regarding total return 
                                                 
89 See Hayes 1987. 
90 See similar study in Sweden: Waldenström 2014. 
91 Since this study mostly uses averages or the whole index, it is not relevant to the whole if 
some stocks were traded less.  
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index.92 This data is also used in this research paper to calculate market caps and other 
metrics fit–to–purpose of this study and was kindly delivered by Vaihekoski on request. 
 
The index is the best available as it includes all the companies listed in the stock 
exchange and take the dividends into account, compared to the UNITAS index that only 
includes a handful of (12 to 13 in this period) companies, though their development is 
eerily similar. It gives a good overall picture about investors returns during the time–
period. Inflation had a huge impact during the war time on real values. Therefore, the 
index is deflated with whole sale price index. Whole sale price is calculated and 
constructed by the author from Bank of Finland yearbooks 1937–1947. Whole sale price 
index is used on the basis that there could be some incentives to manipulate inflation 
data when they are expressed in the form of consumer price index. Whole sale price 
index should be less sensitive to possible manipulation of data, as it is well within the 
realms of realism to assume that consumers are more concerned about the development 
of consumer prices.  
 
However, for measuring geopolitical impacts and news impacts monthly frequency is 
not enough. Therefore, a daily index is built for special purpose of this study by the 
author for certain dates.  The constructed daily index is based on price quotes of 10 
companies with the largest market caps at the end of July 1939. The companies were the 
following (from largest to smallest): Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki, Kymmene Stam, 
Enso–Gutzeit, Kansallis Osake Pankki, Suomen Sokeri, Finlayson & Co. Ab, Yhtyn. 
Paperitehdas, Finska Gummifrabriks Ab, Kemi and Helsingfors Aktiebank. Together 
their market cap was 70% of the whole market cap of the Finnish stock market (4.9 
billion old FIM compared to 7 billion old FIM for the whole Finnish stock market)93 
and should considered to be a representative take and gives a glance on how investors 
reacted to the heightened threat of war where Finland was eventually pulled in 
30.11.1939. The index is calculated as equally weighted index: all the 10 companies in 
the index are given equal weights, reflecting a portfolio of 10 stocks with largest market 
caps. The index gives a satisfyingly accurate picture on how investor’s portfolios 
performed in the eve of the Winter War.  
                                                 
92 Vaihekoski and Nyberg 2009, p. 8–19. 
93 Throughout the paper, billion means 109.  
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The data for the period 1.8.1939–29.11.1939 was collected using the stock quotes in 
Kauppalehti financial newspaper from those dates. Kauppalehti informed stock quotes 
four times a week during August, suggesting the stock market was open four times a 
week and then six days per week during September – November, though it was closed 
when Germany invaded Poland 1.9.1939–4.9.1939 and again 11.10.1939–21.11.1939 
when Finland mobilized its reserves. The days when the stock market was closed are 
included in the index and shares are given the value of the last trading day. The values 
used are bid offers at the end of each day. Closing quotes are not that frequent since 
trading did not occur every day in the bourse where trading volume was thin. 
 
4.2.1. Comparing Indexes 
 
For a comparative analysis where this paper juxtaposes the Finnish stock market 
performance next to the other stock markets, data from the Global Financial Data is 
used. Stock markets included are Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, U.K. and USA.  
It is noteworthy that different indexes use different kind of methods on how they are 
calculated. During this period, it was common to calculate indexes by using arithmetic 
average prices. This is made by adding the prices of all stocks together. After that the 
amount is divided by the number of stocks. According to Global Financial Data, the 
main drawback of this method is that stocks with higher prices affect the index more 
than stocks with lower prices. Another shortcoming is that this type of index does not 
take into calculation dividends, stock splits etc. While stock pricing was quite efficient 
in the New York and London stock exchanges, it was probably inefficient in the other 
five markets. Especially in Germany’s stock market after 1941 when price controls were 
put in place stock prices did not reflect ongoing war or economic situation in any 
meaningful way.94 It is again important to mention that the Nazi Economy was strictly 
regulated and that stock index could be flawed.95 All the indexes are deflated with 
whole sale prices also provided by Global Financial Data to show the real return on 
equities. Indexes are yearly in their nature, as the data was available on yearly basis.  
 
                                                 
94 Bittlingmayer 1998, pp. 2243–2257.  
95 About Nazi Economy, see extensive research by Tooze 2006.  
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4.3. Company Earnings and Other Material 
 
Company net earnings are collected by the author to construct one of the main targets of 
this study: P/E –ratios (explanation for the term below). Individual company earnings 
are collected by the author for the years 1937–1944 from Firmor i Finland –yearbooks 
that contains the income statements and balance sheets of all the listed Finnish 
Companies. In some cases, individual annual reports are viewed to check the data and to 
acquire more specific information about the companies.96 For the years 1945–1947 
earnings data is collected from Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt –yearbooks that contain 
detailed financial information.97 Unfortunately, the year 1946 is missing from a print 
due to animosities in accounting standards. Therefore, earnings are collected for 27 out 
of 47 companies whose annual reports were available (see below the list of companies).  
 
To measure the P/E ratio for the period, market caps and earnings or earnings, share 
prices and the number of shares are needed for the calculation. Share price and the 
number of shares data were courteously received from Vaihekoski. During the earnings 
data collection, nominal equity values and dividends were also collected by the author 
and then compared to the data received from Vaihekoski to verify the correctness of the 
data. There were some instances where the data received from Vaihekoski did not 
match the data in annual reports and financial yearbooks regarding the number of shares 
or share capital.  For example, if a yearbook states that the nominal value of the share 
was X and the whole share capital was Y, then the number of shares are logically the 
result for Y / X. See Appendix for further discussion about companies affected by these 
differences in data. Important note: the number of shares and share price quotes are 
monthly, while earnings, nominal equity values per share and dividends are on yearly 
basis. It fits to the purpose of this study to use the available data as accurately as 
possible. It is also plausible that investors at that time had only yearly results available, 
so it is not that far stretched to compare monthly stock bids data to annual earnings 
when calculating the P/E ratio.  
 
                                                 
96 See the primary sources below.  
97 Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt I 1945/46, Sanomalehti Oy Nylandin Kirjapaino, Helsinki 
1947. and Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt I 1947/48, Kustannusosakeyhtiö Liiketieto, Helsinki 
1949.  
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Quarterly trading volume in the old Finnish marks in HSE was collected by the author 
from UNITAS Bank Yearbooks 1937–1947, where volume is reported quarter by 
quarter.  
 
4.4. Terms explained 
 
Price to earnings ratio. P/E ratio is the price of the stock divided by earnings per share. 
One can also calculate it as the market cap (see the term below) of the company divided 
by fiscal year or 12–month net earnings of the company. In other words, it measures 
with which multiple companies trade compared to their earnings, i.e. how expensive or 
cheap they are. As a heuristic rule, P/E ratio tells how many years it would take for the 
investment to pay itself back, should the E component remain constant. It very much 
seems that the P/E ratio in the calculations of the Helsinki Stock Exchange does not 
reach beyond 1980’s.98 Interestingly enough, this is the first study calculating the P/E 
ratio of Helsinki Stock Exchange in the 1940’s. P/E ratio is the most commonly utilized 
ratio by the investors to gauge how expensive or cheap stocks are as investments.  
 
P/E ratio can also be calculated for the whole index as is done in this paper. The P/E 
ratio will be calculated as the average of all companies, i.e. all the companies get same 
weight in the calculation, and as value weighted P/E ratio where companies with larger 
market caps get greater weight. Inversely, one can calculate a E/P ratio which is equal to 
earnings yield that describes how much the investor would earn if the company would 
pay all its profits out as dividends. 
 
Price to nominal book value. P/NV ratio is used as a substitute for a more accurate and 
descriptive price to book –ratio (discussed below) as there is a lack of data to calculate 
correct book value per share for the years before 1945. Nominal book value here means 
the share capital. Share capital is the initial amount of capital raised by the business by 
selling new shares to investors. Share capital can be subsequently changed by raising 
                                                 
98 See, for example, Bank of Finland Financial Market Report 1/2005, pp. 16–17. Also, Nyberg 
and Vaihekoski do not mention P/E as an interesting topic. Nevertheless, P/E ratios have been 
calculated abroad. Longest data is available for SP500 –index, built by Shiller and accessed here 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Accessed 23.11.2016.  
P/E ratios do have some prediction power too, see: Campbell and Shiller 2001, p. 25–26. 
 27 
more capital. Share capital divided by the share count gives us the nominal value of the 
share. When this nominal value is compared to the price P, we get P/NV. 
  
P/NV and P/B are important ratios when measuring the stock prices against the physical 
net assets behind the companies as investors tried to protect themselves against 
inflation. Comparing P/NV change over time and between different industries gives 
some insight how investors viewed them under war conditions. 
 
Price to book value. P/B ratio is a more descriptive ratio about the pricing of shares, 
but unfortunately the data is hard to obtain prior to 1945. P/B ratio is the share price (or 
market cap) of the company divided by the book value, which is the value of the assets 
in the balance sheet, minus all the liabilities. It can also be stated as net assets of the 
company (there were no intangible asset during this time period that must be taken into 
consideration).  
 
Market capitalization. Market capitalization, or just market cap, is the price or value 
of the whole company, measured as all the number shares multiplied by the price of one 
share. Summing up all the market caps the whole market cap of the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange can be calculated. As implied above, market cap is the present value of all 
discounted future profits.  
 
Dividend. Dividend is a distribution of company’s earnings, or de facto company’s 
assets, to owners of its shares.  Dividends can be paid in cash, stock or other property. 
Dividends are decided by the board of directors. It is assumed that dividends were paid 
once a year in the spring as is the custom nowadays as well.99 
 
Nominal and effective dividend yield. Dividend percentage was usually stated as 
percentage of the nominal value of the stock.  For example, a nominal yield of 10% for 
a stock whose nominal value was 500 marks a dividend of 50 marks was distributed. 
But nominal yield tells us only about the distribution on nominal capital. Effective 
dividend yield is calculated on the real value of the share. To continue the above–
mentioned example, if the same company’s share was priced at 1000 marks, then the 
                                                 
99 See the same assumption in Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2009, p. 14. Also in Palmgren 1958. 
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effective dividend yield was 5%. Calculating the effective yield on stocks and the whole 
market is also an indicator to price levels: lower yield means higher share prices, should 
absolute dividends stay constant. Pay–out ratio tells how the dividend is compared to 
net income. The higher the ratio, the more company distributes its earnings to owners, 
instead of investing in the business or accumulate earnings for itself.100  
 
Market cap to GDP. It is also interesting to compare the whole market cap of the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange to the GDP of Finland at that time. Even more interesting is 
the possible change in that relation over time. Market cap to GDP is an indicator for 
how important or large rôle the stock market played in the Finnish economy.101 Market 
cap to GDP can also be used to gauge the overall price level of the market as company 
profits are one component of GDP. However, in as such a short time frame as in this 
paper, and also, thinking the limited rôle stock market had, this measure should not be 
given too much value.  
 
Return on nominal book value. This study introduces a modification of Return on 
Equity –measure. When ROE is calculated as earnings divided by equity (equity being 
assets minus liabilities), nominal book value is as stated above. It lacks some 
components compared to book value but is the best available measure. Observing 
change in RONV is in this study’s interest.  
 
Behind RONV is a philosophy or way of thinking stocks as bonds: buying a stock is the 
same as buying one own share of book value of the company at a certain market price. 
Earnings are made by utilizing this book value as interest is earned by buying bonds 
(debt) of some entity.  
 
4.5. Helsinki Stock Exchange during 1937–1947: The Market Under Siege 
 
The most important question in this sub chapter is about the efficiency of HSE during 
the Second World War. As asked above, was HSE efficient enough to draw any 
conclusion about the tides of war? How well the companies included in the bourse 
                                                 
100 Interestengly, nowadays dividend yield and effective yield are essentially the same thing in 
vernacular talk as dividend yields are only reported as effective yields.  
101 See long term comparison in Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2011, p. 22.  
 29 
represented the economy as whole? However, first we take a brief tour through the 
history of Helsinki Stock Exchange prior the Second World War.  
 
4.5.1.  The Helsinki Stock Exchange revisited 
 
The Helsinki Stock Exchange has its roots back in the 1860’s when entrepreneurs 
situated in the capital formed an exchange of sorts, but activities were soon muted as the 
famine of 1866–1868 hit the poor and undeveloped country hard.102 Trading was mostly 
halted. Moving to 20th Century, the Stock exchange was launched in 1912 as a formal 
institution, but trading was thin and the public was not used to selling or buying 
securities after a long break. Nevertheless, price quotes were established at least.103 It is 
illustrating of the investors’ information level of the time that, for example in 1914, 
industrial companies did not publish any information about their economic standing, 
income statements or balance sheets. Therefore, trading activity was focused on bank 
stocks that provided some light to their financial statements. Given the thin trading 
volume and very limited information, the Stock Exchange must have looked like some 
sort of Wild West. And soon it got its first wild ride.  
 
Soon after the Bourse opening the First World War broke out. F. Tiderman’s account of 
the time is interesting, because it highlights similar characteristics the market had had in 
the Second World War when it comes to flight–to–safety–effect104, speculation and high 
inflation. The Stock Exchange followed the suit of global stock exchanges and was 
closed most of the time in the second half of 1914. As we remember from above, the 
war came as a shock to financial markets globally. The trading was continued in the 
spring of 1915. Because of the ravaging war across the globe, business activity was 
muted and there was not much need for capital spending leading to growing amount of 
unoccupied, idle capital. At the same time the supply of money was increasing. Finland 
was not a part of the front line in the First World War, but instead provided material to 
the struggling Russian Empire it was part of as an autonomy. This economic activity 
                                                 
102 Tiderman 1937, p. 10–14.  
103 Ibid. p. 36–44.  
104 Common idiom to describe panic–like flight to safe–havens, though usually flight–to–safety 
means quite fast rotation from risk assets such as stocks to more safe assets such as bonds and 
cash.  
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and simultaneous inflation and weakening currency led to huge profits for businesses, 
providing fertile ground for stock market bull run, or hausse105 as it was called that 
time.   
 
By 1916 trading volume increased and the public interest towards equities was aroused. 
Stock prices surged and new companies listed to stock exchange in such a rate that 
similar number of companies listed in the bourse was reached only in the 1980’s.106 
First delighted by the increased interest towards industrial companies, stock exchange 
officials warned that speculation would lead to no good and most rookie traders, using 
margin107, did not have any idea of the fundamentals of the companies: they were only 
chasing fast profits. Interestingly, trading was halted during the civil war in the spring 
1918 but the stock exchange continued trading after it with enthusiasm.108 
 
The abundance of money that fostered equities during 1915–1918 was followed by a 
change in paradigm in the latter half of 1918. Monetary policy tightened and the Bank 
of Finland started lifting interest rates. Inflation peaked in 1921 and faltered after it. 
Margins were cut for stocks. Deposit rates rose from to–date record low of 0,5%. By 
1924, many stocks reached their all–time–lows and the number of companies in the 
bourse were diminished.109 While the evidence is anecdotal, it seems that the stock 
exchange was concurrently a place for speculation and a safe–haven to guard 
purchasing power from high inflation during the war, the very same attributes it attained 
during the Second World War.  
 
In the latter half of the 1920’s the stock exchange revived and made a new all time high 
in 1928, but started sliding after it, well before global rout starting in 1929. Finland left 
the gold standard early, following Britain in 1931 and escaped the worse of the Great 
Depression.110 By 1937 the Stock Exchange had made a new record, but after that the 
skies were not that clear at all.  
                                                 
105 Derived from Swedish, meaning “boom” or “prosperity”.  
106 See number of companies in Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2014, p. 17.  
107 Trading with margin means using leverage provided by broker to buy more shares.  
108 Tiderman 1937, p. 47–59.  
109 Ibid. p. 78–94.  
110 See Fagerholm 2017. 
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4.5.2. Efficient market in the War Economy? 
 
Based on the findings of Tiderman, the Bourse was characterized by swinging investor 
moods, speculation and sudden bull runs or “hausse’s” as he frames it, followed by 
collapses. Investors seemed to act more on the historical price patterns of shares and 
rising share prices fed optimism about more price increases in the future, the so–called 
“greater fool” –game where investors buy shares only to sell them to someone else with 
even higher price. This same anecdotal evidence was also used by Nyberg and 
Vaihekoski.111  Palmgren notes that even in the 1950’s stock investing was regarded as 
“speculation” or not as the hobby of a common man.112 Such claims one can 
occasionally hear even these days. 
 
While it is unclear that how well informed investors were in reality, or could have been, 
it is still plausible to assume that at least the investors with the most money were 
informed and sophisticated agents in the market. It is unfortunate that in his later 
historical account, Tiderman does not describe the mood or quality of investing in the 
bourse during the World War II with much detail.113 When the Bourse was launched, it 
did not have any ethical code of conduct and “hard game” was played. Insider 
information was used mostly impudently. Even respected bank CEO’s took loans from 
other banks to participate in this game.114 It is worth noting that even in one of the most 
sophisticated stock markets, the New York Stock Exchange, analytical approach to 
investing was still quite a new phenomenon though practiced already some time as 
noted above.115 One must also consider the limited amount of information and tools the 
investors of the 1930’s had in their reach. Financial statements were published yearly, 
not quarterly based on the observation that financial sources in this paper were only 
available on yearly basis, probably published ahead of the annual meeting usually held 
in the spring. Banks financial statements and condition were published monthly in 
                                                 
111 See Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2011, p. 10.  
112 Palmgren 1958, p. 65. 
113 See Tiderman 1962, p. 11–20. 
114 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 50–51.  
115 A (value–) investing bible still today, Benjamin Graham’s and David Dodd’s classic Security 
Analysis was first published 1934, after the devastating bear market of 1929–1933.  
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Kauppalehti, so investors could have had accurate picture how business in banks was 
developing.116 
 
It is important to concern the larger picture as well. The whole economy was under 
stress during the war period. Finland was not particularly well prepared for war in 1939. 
Forethought and ahead–planning was weak. During the summer 1939 several laws were 
imposed to improve crisis–readiness.117 The Winter War was so short that it did not 
create extensive regulation or top–down–led production but The Continuation War 
brought Finland closer to a planned economy. By May 1941, Finnish economic 
landscape could be described as a centralized war economy, a mode that prevailed for 
the rest of the war.118 The economy of the whole Europe was in a devastated condition 
during the war. At the height of Germany’s reach of power in 1942, all financial 
dealings were concentrated in Berlin and resources of occupied territories, satellite 
states and Axis courtiers were harnessed for the German war machine.119 Finland had to 
operate in this European new economic order until 1944 when she broke her alliance 
with Germany and all the economic ties were cut off, excluding Sweden. This could 
have affected businesses of many companies listed in the stock exchange too. The 
foreign trade was limited to mostly Germany during the period 1939–1944, limiting 
export prices but elevating import expenses.120  
 
Other important aspect affecting the efficiency of the market was, of course, the 
tightening regulative environment and government intervention. As mentioned above, it 
was in the government’s interest to harness all the available financial resources to 
finance the war effort. Flow of money to Bourse was against this imperative. Stamp tax 
rose on April 26th 1941 from 1% to 1.8% and subsequently to 4% in August 1941 where 
it stayed until 1949. Dividends were restrained but that had little impact on stock prices. 
Instead it meant that more real value such as monetary assets stayed in the balance 
sheets of companies, which attracted buyers. Capital controls were imposed, restricting 
                                                 
116 Based on Kauppalehti 1.8–30.11.1939.   
117 See Pihkala 1982, pp. 317–333.  
118 Heikkinen and Tiihonen 2009, p. 205–218; Ahvenainen et al. 1982, p. 317–328. See also 
Nars 1966.  
119 Aldcroft 2001, p. 94–101. However, it seems that as a rule, Nazi Germany truly exploited 
only countries it had militarily occupied. See Ritschl 2001, pp. 324–345.  
120 For Finnish wartime economy, see also Numminen 1993, p. 262–264.  
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movement of capital over borders and limiting options where to allocate financial 
recourses. Taxes affected Bourse significantly and because of thin trading volume 
expiry dates affected share prices, Stjernschantz remarks. For example, in November 
1943 “huge” taxes were expiring and UNITAS index, the only available stock index 
that time, slipped from June to October from 270 points to 210 points, or one–fifth 
when investors raised cash for the taxes. To tame speculation, the Bourse lifted 
transaction costs from 0.5% to 0.75% in the beginning of July 1943.121 The government 
tried to cool down rising share prices by forcing 13 new companies to list in the Stock 
Exchange in May 1942. The list included well–known household names such as 
Stockmann and Rautatiekirjakauppa, the predecessor of Suomalainen.122 It would be an 
omission to ignore interest rates too. However, during this period the basic interest rate 
by the Bank of Finland was flat at 4% for almost the whole period excluding 3.12.1934–
5.6.1947 when it rose to 4.5% and 15.12.1947–5.2.1948 when it was subsequently lifted 
to 5.25%.123 The Bank of Finland was subordinated to near–control of government and 
participated in the war effort to bolster savings, keep banking rates artificially low and 
channel money to war expenditures via war bonds.124 In a free market, basic rate should 
steer other rates, and they were low indeed to finance wartime expenditures with cheap 
credit.125  
 
Interesting curiosity during the period was Förvaltningskoncernen För Ersättningsaktier, 
nicknamed Holding Concernen. After the war, Finland had lost parts of its territories 
and many refugees lost their fortunes as well. The government decided to give financial 
compensation for all the evacuated refugees. Compensation meant smaller sums in cash 
or inflation–protected bonds, but larger sums with shares of Holding Koncernen. On 
October 1945, all the companies with taxable assets larger than 10 million old FIM were 
required to pay capital gain tax of 20% on taxable assets as company shares. These 
shares were transferred to Holding who soon owned 20% of major Finnish companies 
                                                 
121 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 80–83. 
122 See Kantanen 2012.  
123https://www.suomenpankki.fi/globalassets/fi/tilastot/korot/documents/peruskoron_muutokset
_fi.pdf. Accessed 4.2.2017.  
124 See Kuusterä 2012, pp. 36–50. 
125 The interest of 4% was the lowest basic rate since the end of the 19th Century. Interest rates 
can be viewed as substitutes to earnings yield offered by stocks. In this case however, interest 
rates were pushed artificially low so real comparison between those two is meaningless. 
Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb, stocks should offer higher yield than risk–free interest rates.  
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and had initial nominal book value of 4.3 billion old FIM (approximately 13% of the 
value of the whole the Finnish stock market according to authors calculation). Refugees 
received the shares and yearly dividends, but many sold them to investors right away. 
Holding became the most traded stock in the Bourse for few years after the war.126 
 
It is imperative to concern trading volume as well. There were several interruptions in 
trading during the time period under concern. Trading was halted after the German 
invasion of Poland 1.9–4.9.1939 and then 10.10–22.11.1939 as tensions rose with 
Soviet Union. During the Winter War the stock exchange was closed altogether 
30.11.1939–31.3.1940. The break can clearly be seen in the first quarter of 1940 in the 
cart below. After that trading continued as normal.127 Trading volume rose especially 
after the war, but diminished value of money must be taken into account as well. As can 
be seen from the deflated and indexed trading volume chart, the real money value of 
volume peaked in the first quarter of 1937 and stayed approximately at one–fifth of that 
level the rest of the period. Some companies were more liquid than others. See the 
quarterly volume on chart 1 in millions of old FIM and as WSP–deflated index in 
chart 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126 Kantanen 2012, p. 116–119.  
127 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 78.  
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Chart 1. Quarterly Trading Volume in HSE 1937–1947 
Millions old FIM 
Source: UNITAS yearbooks 1937–1947.  
 
Chart 2. Quarterly WSP–Deflated Trading Volume in HSE 1937–1947 
Indexed, January 1937=100. Monthly average volume per quarter. 
 
Source: UNITAS yearbooks 1937–1948. 
 
For example, Industri–Hypoteksbanken had only a few price quotes during the whole 
time period. But on aggregate, the stock exchange remained functional and traded 
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4.6. Companies in the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
 
Below is the list of all listed companies in an alphabetical order in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange during 1937–1947. The total number of companies was 54 while 35–50 
companies were listed simultaneously. Firms are coded as “1” when they were listed 
and “0” when not. If they were listed or delisted during this period, the time of the event 
is mentioned. Companies whose earnings are missing in fiscal year 1946 are marked 
with a star * and Holding Concernen is marked with two stars ** as it had no earnings 
available too and performed as a holding company. Holding Concernen became the 
most traded stock in the exchange after the war.  
 
Table 1. Companies Listed in HSE during 1937–1947 
 
 
Source: Vaihekoski and Nyberg 2009 and Kock http://www.porssitieto.fi/ (accessed 15.2.2017).  
 
As the chart 3 below states, the bourse represented many sections of the Finnish 
economy. Industrial companies such as Wärtsilä or Finska Gummifabriks were the most 
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numerous with nine to 11 companies, or around one quarter of all the companies in the 
HSE. When the famous forest industry, with companies such as Yhtyn. Paperitehdas 
(United Papermills), Kemi or Enso–Gutzeit, is included their share of all companies rise 
to around one third. Financials was another important sector with six to nine banks and 
four insurance companies representing together around one–fifth of all the companies.  
 
Chart 3. Companies Categorized in HSE 1937–1947 
 
Companies categorized to bank, forest industry, industrials, insurance, logistics, retail, textile industry and 
the other by the author. 
 
As the chart 4 below shows, the number of companies was quite stable during the first 
half of the period under concern. It rose during May 1942 as the government forced 13 
new companies to be listed in the bourse in order to contain speculative price 
development by increasing supply of shares. After this intervention, some companies 
left the Bourse as they went out of business.  
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Chart 4. Month–end Number of Companies Listed 1937–1947 
 
Source: Vaihekoski and Nyberg 2009.  
 
It is yet important to observe how many large companies were represented in the stock 
exchange to gauge how important bellwether the Bourse was for the economy. As 
shown above in table 2, different business categories, especially banks and industrial 
companies, were well represented.  
 
Table 2. Market cap to GDP 1937–1947 
 
The market cap of HSE can be compared to GDP to gauge the importance of the stock market, too. As the 
table shows, the market cap was less than fifth of the nominal value of GDP during the time period, 
underlining the small rôle of Finnish stock market in the Finnish economy. Source: For GDP, Statistics of 
Finland. Author calculations based on Vaihekoski–data. 
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Hjerppe has listed the 34 biggest industrial companies in Finland during 1938.128 She 
has ranked them by the number of employees. In the above table companies are ranked 
by the value of their nominal book value, since it is usually more stable measurement 
compared to market cap or volatile earnings. Kymmene, Enso–Gutzeit and Suomen 
Sokeri stand in the league of their own when comparing nominal book values.  
 
As can be seen below in table 3, out of 34 biggest companies 16 were listed in the stock 
exchange. More important, six of them is included in top 10. The most important 
Finnish companies 
 
Table 3. The Biggest Industrial Companies in HSE 1938 
Biggest	Industrial	Companies	in	
Finland	1938
Rank	by	
employees	
(Hjerppe) Employees
Gross	production	value,	
million	old	FIM
Nominal	
book	value*
Market	Cap,	
million	old	
FIM*
Kaukas	Fabrik 16 1867 236 - -
Vasa	Bomull 21 1463 67 - -
1 Kymmene	stam 6 3697 839 350 718
2 Enso-Gutzeit	Oy 2 4702 769 324 732
3 Suomen	Sokeri	 25 1067 420 300 500
4 Wärtsilä	Oy 1 5938 506 192 125
5 Pargas	Kalkbergs 20 1593 234 190 386
6 Finlayson	&	Co	AB 3 4498 226 160 243
7 Tammerfors	Linne	&	Jern	Man 4 4410 367 160 340
8 Kemi	Trävaruaktiebolag 22 1433 277 150 203
9 Yhtyneet	Paperitehtaat 15 1883 459 135 270
10 De	Förenta	Yllefabrikerna	stam 14 1932 116 68 50
Finska	Gummifabriks	AB 10 2163 182 63 257
Suomen	Trikootehdas 12 2096 125 54 119
Arabia 17 1824 91 32 32
Strömberg 27 1006 80 12 25
*If	listed	to	HSE	during	1938,	values	year	end. 3998
Source: Hjerppe 1979. 
 
are well presented in the stock exchange, it could be said. The biggest banks such as 
KOP and Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki are not included, but they had market caps of 
FIM 711.3 and FIM 915.6 million, respectively and nominal book values of nearly FIM 
                                                 
128 See Hjerppe, Riitta: Suurimmat Yritykset Suomen Teollisuudessa 1844–1975. Societas 
Scientiarum Fennica, Helsinki 1979, p. 174. 
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250.0 and FIM 280.0 million. The total market cap of Finnish stock market in 1938 
stood at FIM 6.7 billion, so these 16 biggest companies represented almost 60% of the 
whole market cap (Kaukas Fabrik and Vasa Bomull are not included since they were 
not listed during 1938) and including the two biggest banks biggest companies the 18 
biggest companies occupied 84% of the whole market cap of HSE.   
 
 
5. The Finnish Equity Market in the Second World War: 
Geopolitical Crisis from Investor Perspective: The Analysis 
 
The analysis section delves into Helsinki Stock Exchange performance during the 
Second World War. This paper has already illustrated the larger context, the theoretical 
and methodological concepts behind this study and the material used. Regulatory and 
war economy environments have been briefly touched as well. This section walks 
chronologically through the turbulent period of 1937–1947. Earnings and earnings 
multiples derived from them are discussed and utilized when analysing investor returns. 
The conclusion will follow.   
 
5.1.  The Stock Market and Rising Awareness of Geopolitical Risks: Autumn 
1939.  
 
Nominally, the Finnish stock market had seen whipsaw movement after the market peak 
in the autumn 1937. In 1937, the United States slumped to yet another recession after a 
decision to withdraw from public stimulus policy supporting the fragile economy. 
Geopolitical tensions were rising when Japan invaded China after the Marco Polo 
bridge incident that rapidly escalated into full–scale onslaught. Back in Europe, the 
Finnish stock market headed -15% lower during September 1937 to March 1938, when 
Anschluss, Germany’s annexation of Austria, occurred. Stjernschantz remarks that 
trading got more thin during “these agitated times as buyers and sellers were confused”. 
Industrial companies fared better than banks and forest industry and actually, some 
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companies made new all–time–highs in the summer 1939. Expectations about looming 
catastrophe caused fear, but the state of denial was dominating.129  
 
The financial newspaper Kauppalehti painted a somewhat mixed view on the looming 
war. On the other hand, at least the war between Germany and Poland must have been 
well seen before hand. On the August three, the speech of Danzig’s Governor was cited 
in Kauppalehti, telling “We Danzigians wish nothing so much but the German Navy to 
enter our harbour permanently”.130 On 22nd August Kauppalehti had a large citation 
from London, saying “the War is inevitable” after the Russo–German non–aggression 
pact that created confusion around the world as Soviet Union had been negotiating with 
the Western powers in the summer. Other citation said “The fate of Poland is sealed” 
and the third “After Poland, it is the turn of Western powers”.131 Still, the daily index 
had been trading in a few percent point range during the whole August.  
 
An abrupt change came 24th August when the daily index slided -1.19% as the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop–pact was signed. It seems that, as Stjernshantz remarks, investors 
were in a state of confusion and waited for further evidence on how the political 
landscape was to evolve in Central Europe. On August 25th, the daily index slid  
-2.02%. The Finnish Government bond yields started climbing at the end of August, 
echoing uneasiness among the ranks of investors.132 On Monday 28th August, the 
Hitler’s ultimatum to Poland became public and Kauppalehti headline ingress cited the 
German demand that “Danzig and land connection (East–Prussia) to Germany; 
Macedonian living conditions for German living hoods in Poland must be stopped.”133 
German army invaded Poland with overwhelming land and air power in the early 
morning of 1st September, unleashing the Second World War in Europe. 
 
The Second World War was not a surprise but more like a “long–anticipated event” to 
contemporary observers in Europe.134 But contemporaries could not have known for 
sure. In Finland, it seems that the public was caught by surprise that how fast the 
                                                 
129 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 73.  
130 Kauppalehti 3.8.1939, MF 70422.  
131 Kauppalehti 22.8.1939. 
132 Waldenström and Frey 2007, p. 31.  
133 Kauppalehti 28.8.1939. The German over friendly tone of Kauppalehti raises eye browns. 
134 Ferguson 2008, p. 462.  
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conflict escalated. The CEO of Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki, the largest company by 
market cap in the HSE during that time, said in September that “the looming crisis, 
assuming political catastrophe will be avoided, is probably not as deep nor as escalated 
as the previous one”. The optimism of the late 1930’s rising living standards and 
economic growth might have affected the line of thought behind the statement.135 It 
seems that the optimistic view that Finland would not be a target for belligerent actions 
was widespread. A history of Suomen Sokeri (the Finnish Sugar Company) states that 
“the management of Suomen Sokeri was as surprised as the common man on how fast 
global political landscape turned dark” in the late 1930’s.136 The threat of war seemed 
so remote in Finland that even fertilizer production, a very essential part of running 
agriculture dominated economy, was not prepared for exceptional tail events nor the 
reserve stockpile was adequate in the event of war.137 When negotiations with Moscow 
ended in cul–de–sac, the possibility of war was still seen as remote, even though some 
Finns were and had been for long very sceptical of the true intentions of Soviet 
Union.138  
 
While the official writing of history says the war was seen as unlikely, the stock market 
reacted with almost a panic–like mode when the actual fighting began, see the chart 5 
below. The stock market was closed in Finland from 1st September to 4th September, but 
opened on the 5th day again, only to continue sliding by -1.14% with “a tranquil mood 
but rising interest from public”.139 It is interesting to note a contradictory in that 
Kauppalehti stated most industrial companies reached new all–time–highs, a movement 
not captured by the daily index in this study. After that, a few days passed with no 
movement whatsoever and then on 8th and 9th September it reached a bottom for few 
days. The daily index was down -4% since the beginning of German invasion. By the 
end of September, as it was becoming clear that the war would affect foreign commerce 
and business relations, the daily index was down -11% from 31st August bids. Also, the 
rising Finnish bond yields after the break out of war on 1st September pointed out for 
the heightened risk of war. The bond market was anticipating trouble at least from that 
                                                 
135 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 73–74.  
136 Suomen Sokeri Oy: Suomen Sokeri Osakeyhtiö 1918–1968. Frenckellin Kirjapaino Oy, 
Helsinki 1970, p. 8. 
137 Seppälä 1995, p. 161–166.  
138 Tarkka 2010, p. 39.  
139 Kauppalehti 5.9.1939.  
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point on, months ahead of the Winter war.140 On 10th October The Finnish Government 
called for reservists to enlist, de–facto mobilizing Finland’s defence. Stocks in the daily 
index slid, bringing the index down more than -6% on 9th and 10th October after which 
the trading in the stock exchange was suspended. The index was down -14% from the 
beginning of Germany’s invasion of Poland. It could be argued, based on the evidence 
illustrated by movements in the index, that the Finnish stock market was startled by the 
beginning of the war, and interestingly, anticipated that Finland would be drawn into 
war. This argument is well in line with Waldenström and Frey who have argued that 
Finnish government bonds anticipated a growing risk of war from late August as 
well.141 
 
Chart 5. Equally Weighted Daily Index 1.8–30.11.1939 
31.8.1939=100 
 
Source: authors construction based on bid prices in Kauppalehti 1.8–30.11.1939. An equally weighted 
daily index. The stock market was clearly aware of the rising risk of the war. Crucial date marked with 
explosion figure, marking the announcement of Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, Invasion of Poland, 
mobilization of reserves and the beginning of the Winter war.  
 
                                                 
140 Waldenström and Frey 2007, p. 17.   
141 Ibid., p. 20.  
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The stock market was closed for six weeks when Finland was negotiating with Soviet 
Union. Market opened on 22nd November and rallied 4.19% that day. Kauppalehti 
commented briefly that “stocks rose broadly and the mood was calm”.142 
 
However, after the brief relief rally the daily index dive again to achieve new lows on 
29th November, a level almost one–fifth lower compared to end of August.  When the 
Red Army crossed the border on 30th November, the stock exchange was closed and 
stayed that way for the whole Winter War. A Kauppalehti headline told that “The Soviet 
Union has broken the peace” and “the mood is calm and determined in the whole 
country”.143 It is noteworthy that the situation was still unclear for the political elite. 
The sitting government wondered the very same day if Finland should declare a state of 
war when the meeting was interrupted by Soviet bombers flying over Helsinki.144 The 
Finnish colonel Wolf H. Halsti formulated that “it is unfortunate… that policymakers 
lacked the capacity to see what was coming and the capability to prepare in a way that 
was supported by the facts… the government could not foresee the war but staggered 
into it blindly.”145 While policymakers were perhaps “blind to facts”, it seems that the 
market was discounting war since the announcement of Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. It is 
of course very hard to tell that was the market discounting more a harsh business 
environment, as the global trade started to suffer from the war, or were stocks seen as 
riskier investments because of direct threat of war pointing to Finland. In its annual 
statement, Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki complained that blockades raised by the 
belligerent states caused much trouble for maritime trade and “the treacherous attack by 
our big eastern neighbour” further escalated these problems.146 The trade was severely 
reduced with Western powers after the German invasion of Poland, but during the 
Winter war trade was restricted to Sweden as Germany was still with warm relations 
with Soviet Union.147   
 
A glance to pricing of stocks could offer some insight here. P/E hovered approximately 
                                                 
142 Kauppalehti 22.11.1939. 
143 Kauppalehti 30.11.1939.  
144 Polvinen, Tuomo: J.K. Paasikivi: Valtiomiehen Elämäntyö 3 1939–1944. Werner Söderström 
Osakeyhtiö, Helsinki 1995, p. 64–65.  
145 Wolf H. Halsti: Aika vaatii veronsa. Muistelmat 2. 1939–1948, Keuruu 1974 p. 49.  
146 Pohjoismaiden Yhdyspankki, Annual Statement 1939, Helsinki 1949, p. 3.  
147 Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, p. 55.  
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in the range 17–18, depending if one looks at the average or the market cap weighted 
ratio (see chart). On July 1939, the average was 17.1, that is 11% percent more than the 
average (of average P/E) during January 1937 till November 1939 of 15.4. However, it 
reversed back to the average at the end of November 1939 which implies that 
businesses were seen more riskier investments than in the summer. While it sounds like 
a no–brainer itself, this kind of reasoning is something that has not been used before in 
historical studies and it gives precious insight in how stocks were priced during that 
time and what sort of factors were the primus motor behind price moves.  
 
The average dividend yield was 5.69% on November versus the average of 4.95% 
during January 1937 to November 1939, implying that investors wanted more yield to 
compensate the heightened risk scene. Finnish Government bonds offered similar yields 
of bit less than 6%, rising from 5% just before the war. It seems that at this point 
investors were still quite happy to hold more riskier stocks even if bonds, those 
preferred investment vehicles of gentlemen148, offered very similar return. Financial 
markets were expecting trouble ahead for Finland since the end of August and 
beginning of operation Fall Weiss (German Poland–offensive). In case of belligerent 
Germany, it seems that her fate was anticipated very early. It is interesting to note that 
by observing bond price movements in the Swiss Bourse, Frey and Kucher conclude 
that “The Second World War was from the very beginning considered to be a losing 
enterprise for Germany and a deadly threat to German public foreign debt –quite in 
contrast to the gains in land, resources and power that the Nazi leaders promised their 
subjects.”149 
 
5.2. The Unstable Interim Peace and the Flight–For–Safety 
 
Winter war ended in the Interim Peace, lasting from 13th March 1940 till 24th June 1941 
when Finland aimed to recover the lost area, around one–tenth of her surface area, from 
Soviet Union. The simultaneous German strategic aim was to annihilate the whole 
Soviet Union via the infamous Operation Barbarossa. The volatility spiked after the 
Bourse was re–opened on 1st April 1940 as seen in Chart 6. April 1940 was the third 
                                                 
148 As quoted in Marilyn Monroe film Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, 1953.  
149 Frey and Kucher 2001, pp. 317–333, p. 332.  
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volatile month when the index rose by 30%. The position of Finland was unclear after 
the Winter War. The German occupation of Denmark and Norway made it increasingly 
clear that strict neutrality was out of question in German–occupied Europe and Finland 
would have to align herself with Nazi Germany which happened in late 1940. Soon 
Finland was included militarily in plans related to Operation Barbarossa.150 Germany 
also needed raw materials from Finland and for example around third of wood imports 
to Germany were exported from Finland.151 This could have affected the demand for 
products of some Finnish companies.  
 
Chart 6. Monthly Change in the Finnish Stock market 1937–1947 
In percentage terms 
 
Source: Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2009.  
 
After the dramatic volatility, the stock market consolidated during 1940–1941 and 
started to heal its losses taken during previous years. A flight–to–safety effect can also 
be seen. While economy suffered lack of goods, Bank of Finland monetized debt to 
provide purchase power for the Finnish war machine, a move that unravelled into higher 
prices. As mentioned above, stocks are believed to protect from inflation. While short 
term speculation was curtailed effectively by raising taxes on stock trading, restrictions 
on the companies ability to pay dividends led to increasing book value per share when 
companies made profit. That of course attached attention of investors who sought a safe 
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place or profitable opportunities for their money.152 The movement is rational from 
investors’ or savers’ perspective, since in a closed economy, where else the money 
could go unless to the stock market if capital movements are blocked. 
 
The beginning of operation Barbarossa was taken positively in the stock market which 
can clearly be seen in the index. The Finnish stock market seems to reflect quite 
perfectly the evolving strategic situation in Europe. From June 1941 to April 1942 it 
rose approximately 14% in real terms and 37% nominal terms, almost to levels seen 
before the Winter War (in real terms). In nominal terms, it almost tripled from the end 
of Winter War till the spring of 1942. By April German Ostfront managed to repel the 
Russian Spring counter–offensive and Rommel turned the tide in North Africa for a 
while. The Imperial Navy and Army of Japan had seized the control of almost all 
British and Dutch colonies and controlled the Pacific Sea for a moment. After that, the 
index started to decrease slowly. It is possible that the stock market in Finland expected 
the Axis victory, at least in the Eastern Front, till the spring of 1942. At the beginning of 
operation Barbarossa, the German High Command and many others had expected the 
same. Soviet losses were so huge and Wehrmacht’s advance so fast that German chief 
of the OKH General Staff Franz Halder marked in his diary, a bit prematurely, that 
“probably it is not an overstatement to say that Russian resistance will be crushed in two 
weeks” in July 1941.153 
 
The above–mentioned conclusion is alluring, but it leaves lot of room for speculation. 
Though it could be plausible to think that Axis victory would have been compelling to 
Finnish Companies and Bourse in general, after the bull run to spring 1942 highs the 
market remained volatile but did not move into any direction. By looking at the pricing 
of the market (see below) we know that valuations were stretched and stocks must have 
                                                 
152 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 78–80.  
153 Cited in Braithwaite 2007, p. 205. 
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looked less compelling in terms of future investment returns. See chart 7 for stock 
market performance. 
 
Chart 7. The Finnish stock market: Nyberg and Vaihekoski Total Return Index 
Performance, deflated with WSP Index 1937–1947 
31.8.1939=100, monthy 
 
Source: Nyberg & Vaihekoski 2009.  
 
As mentioned above, the huge tax payments affected the market when investors were 
forced to raise cash. Therefore, the downward slopes are hard to see as the financial 
commentary on Finland’s war fortune. Instead, it is probable that from 1941 and 1942 
onwards, the stock market was more about flight–to–safety effect protecting savings 
from inflation, rather than pure play fundamental analysis based investing in a long time 
frame. 
 
The year 1944 is one of the “turning points” in the history of Finland.154 The 
independence of Finland was highly uncertain when Soviet Union launched a major 
offensive in the Karelian Isthmus 9.6.1944 and advanced rapidly to Vyborg which fell 
in 20th June. The stock market slid in June, probably mirroring the worsening situation 
at the front: the index fell 6.8% but rose back in August as it became clear that Soviet 
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offensive was stalled. In the beginning of June, the ever Germany–toady Kauppalehti 
informed investors about the upcoming Allied landing operation in France, and when it 
eventually materialized on 6th June, about its difficulties as if the Allied invasion stalled 
outright on the beaches of Normandy.155 Soviet invasion in Karelian Isthmus was only 
briefly mentioned on 10th June, probably because of censorship and limited information, 
but following days it occupied the frontlines along with war news from intense hedge–
hog fighting in Normandy.156 The credit for the downward slide in the Bourse was given 
to “recent military events”, referring to Soviet invasion against surprised Finnish 
defences.157 
 
The armistice was negotiated in September after Finland managed to fend off the Soviet 
offensive. Political situation was highly uncertain because Lapland was occupied by 
German soldiers and the Soviet Union’s policy towards Finland was yet to take its new 
shape and direction.158 From August to November 1944 the stock market lost fifth of its 
nominal value, but speculative boom resurrected by the beginning of 1945 as inflation 
spiralled and supply of money was plenty. The sequential speculative boom and the 
‘danger years’ are discussed later with more detail.  
 
5.3. Comments on the earnings of companies listed in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. 
 
One of the main targets of this paper is to collect, analyse and establish time–series for 
companies listed in the stock exchange. This information is crucial when judging how 
investors perceived stocks as investments and how they priced them during this period. 
Consider a historian looking at rising stock index without any knowledge of underlying 
profitability of the companies in the index. How could she or he make any assumptions 
why the stock market rose? Or, at least knowing the fundamentals can help to greatly 
reduce the level of speculation as history never shows us all the dark corners.  
 
                                                 
155 Kauppalehti. 7.6.1944. The biggest amphibious (and airborne) landing operation in history, 
and quite successful: less than one year later, there were no Third Reich anymore. 
156 Kauppalehti 10.6.1944. 
157 Kauppalehti 13.6.1944. 
158 Kirby 2006, p. 232–233. 
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Chart 8. Yearly Company Earnings in HSE at year end, 1937–1947 
Millions old FIM (left axis) and indexed and deflated with WSP, right axis, January 
1937=100 
 
Source: authors calculations. See primary sources. Note that some earnings are missing from the year 
1946 as noted above.  
 
As can be seen from the chart 8, without calculating in the inflation, company earnings 
rose from around 400 million old FIM in 1937 to 1.4 billion old FIM in 1947. It is in 
place to remind the reader about partially missing earnings in 1946.159 However, as the 
indexed number tells us, when counting in the diminished value of purchasing power, 
company earnings in 1947 were over 60% less in real terms than in 1937. It is important 
to note that company listings add up to amounts, but their effect should be limited. The 
spike in 1942 can be however partly explained by newcomers in the stock exchange, but 
the effect is small since most of the companies forced to list were smaller in size.  
 
                                                 
159 Had the missing earnings been the same as in 1945, the earnings sum “missing” is 
approximately 248 million old Finnish marks, or around one–third compared to that year 
earnings of 883 million marks. Together these numbers would be around 1.1 billion marks, so 
the earnings jump in 1947 would look less dramatic but still significant nevertheless.  
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The other way to look at the earnings is to see how stable they were compared to book 
value. This perspective is built on the philosophy that stocks are like bonds: investor 
buys his or her own share of the book value of a company. The company gets a certain 
return to this book value. The investor return should converge with this return on equity 
over time, 
 
Chart 9. RONV Average and Marker Cap Weighted 1937–1947 
In percentage terms 
 
Authors calculations based on primary sources and Vaihekoski data. RONV is calculated as earnings 
(collected by the author) divided by nominal book values (collected by the author). Market caps are based 
on Vaihekoski data.  
 
depending how much the investor paid for the stock compared to book value. In this 
calculation, nominal book value is used (see terms explained above). 
 
The minimum average RONV was 8% in 1940 and the maximum was 22% during 1946 
as the chart 9 shows. Changes in book value affect this measurement and nominal book 
value rose threefold during 1937–1947, but nominal earnings were up four–fold. 
Unfortunately, nominal book value is only loosely linked to the real equity of a 
company, as company can have other assets as well in the asset side of the balance 
sheet. However, based on this evidence, the earnings of HSE companies compared to 
nominal values were volatile. Their profitability improved hugely from 1940 till 1946, 
probably skewed by inflation since the asset values are not changed immediately with 
inflation, whereas earnings reflect inflation right away when companies raise prices of 
their end–products.  
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5.4. The price level of the Helsinki Stock Exchange during 1937–1947, or flight–
to–safety–effect rediscovered.  
 
Earnings data allows us to calculate the P/E–ratio for HSE during the time period under 
consideration. As implied above, it is unclear how much investors followed 
fundamentals when investing and how much they were speculating with stock 
movements. Nevertheless, it could be said that the stock market price level was 
reasonable during most of the time in the time frame. The speculative booms can be 
clearly seen in this statistical data, supporting anecdotal evidence offered by 
Stjernschantz.  
 
The HSE traded with earnings multiples of 13 to 18 from January 1937 to November 
1939. Earnings remained effectively constant, so stock market was soft because of 
lowering multiples, not because of falling earnings, though the economic prosperity 
achieved by 1937 seemed to be threatened by the end of 1930’s.160 Remember from the 
above that the HSE movements remained broadly calm during 1937 to Autumn 1939. 
The “escape to real values” Stjernschantz remarked could be seen at the end of 1940 
and especially in 1941, can be proved by P/E ratios as well.   
 
We know that earnings were not improving, but in real terms declining sharply. But 
price multiple almost doubled from the beginning of 1941 from 16.7 (average P/E for 
all HSE companies) to 28.2 by March 1942. The government actions to cool down 
equities seemed to work from this perspective, since earnings were growing with 
inflation or at least stayed constant on aggregate during 1941–1945 but P/E multiples 
slid back to more sustainable levels and were around 21 times earnings 1943–1944.161 
 
                                                 
160 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 74.  
161 There is no P/E data for long periods of time in Finland, but for US markets the P/E ratio has 
been on average 15 during 1871–2016. See Shiller’s calculations in http://www.multpl.com/. 
Accessed 17.1.2017. We can only assume that this multiple has been similar in Finland for 
longer periods. Median forward P/E, looking earnings one year ahead, has been around 16 in 
Finland during 2006–2016. Source: Bloomberg. 
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Chart 10. P/E Ratios, Market Cap Weighted and Average 1937–1947 
 
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
The huge multiple expansion during 1945 and the sequential collapse can be seen very 
clearly in the above chart 10. Stjernschantz remarks that curiosity towards stocks 
awakened up again after few year’s lethargic period and especially industrial stocks 
were traded by the public. Industrial stocks gave protection against the rising inflation, 
it was said. To add up to the speculative boom, the supply of cheap margin was plenty. 
“The atmosphere started to resemble races with wagers doing bets with their stretching 
antennas”.162 Tiderman notes that the reason for this surge in stock prices cannot be 
explained by rising optimism about the economic condition of the war ridden nation, 
but rather by the galloping inflation. The bourse committee even introduced limits of 
10% and, for a few days, 2% of daily movements in stock prices (nobody was willing to 
sell after 2% rise, of course) to cool down the stock jubilee.163 Earnings multiples 
manifest this speculation well as the average P/E for HSE companies rose from 16.7 in 
January to 51.7 in July, only to violently drop to 33.9 by year–end and reaching 16.5 in 
August 1947, or -68% below the peak. 
  
                                                 
162 Interesting comparison to snails by Stjernschantz 1987, p. 82.  
163 Tiderman 1962, p. 15–17.  
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This same story can be also seen in P/NV ratios, though nominal equity book value was, 
of course, more stable. By looking at these business fundamentals, Stjernschantz’s 
remarks about hot stock market or speculation can be verified. Still, the trading room 
was more quiet compared to the noise and ruckus in 1918, as trading was automatized 
and only 12 traders were just pushing buttons and executing trades.164 The price levels 
are showed in table 4 below. 
 
Table 4. Measures of Price Levels in HSE 1937–1947 
  P/E mcap weighted P/E average P/NV w P/NV a 
MAX 60.11 51.68 10.08 8.07 
MIN 13.32 11.80 1.69 1.53 
AVERAGE 21.86 20.39 3.09 2.75 
MEDIAN 19.78 19.51 2.85 2.59 
Source: Authors calculations for P/E, Vaihekoski and the author for P/NV.  
 
Chart 11. Dividends in HSE 1937–1947 
 
Source: authors calculations and Vaihekoski. Market cap weighted and average dividend yields and 
average pay–out ratios, in percentage terms. 
 
 
Another way to look at the price levels is to calculate the average dividend yield for 
HSE, see chart 11. The dividend yield on average was a maximum of 5.69% on the eve 
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of Winter War and reached the bottom of 1.74% during the speculative boom followed 
by peace in 1945.  
 
The average and market cap weighted dividend yields dropped during the war, 
indicating that investors gave more weight on share price development rather than cash 
flow received via dividends. The average yield on HSE companies was 3.68% during 
the time period. Average pay–out ratio, calculated as E/P (an inverse P/E to get earnings 
yield) divided by dividend yield, moved in a range from 56.96% to 91.13%. The 
average pay–out ratio was 73%, meaning that businesses distributed their profits mostly 
to owners, despite restrictions on dividend pay–outs as mentioned above.  
 
5.5. Different Industries: Different Stories. 
 
The war did not treat different industries in an equal way: especially the banking sector 
was devastated by the rampaging inflation. As has been explained above, industries 
with physical assets fared much better during this turbulent period. For this study, an 
index with 12 different companies has been assembled using stock bid data received 
from Vaihekoski and the earnings data collected by the author for the calculation of P/E 
ratios, see chart 12.  
 
Each industry category is an average comprised of indexed performances of the three 
biggest companies as measured by nominal book values. The included stocks were as 
follows: for Bank index: Kansallis Osake Pankki, Yhdyspankki and Helsingfors 
Aktiebank; textile industry: Finlayson, Tammerfors Linne & Jern Man and De förenta 
Yllefabrikerna stam; industrial companies: Wärtsilä, Nokia and Finska Gummifabriks; 
and for forest industry: Yhtyn. Paperitehdas, Kymmene and Enso–Gutzeit were used. 
To remind the reader, companies like Wärtsilä and Tammerfors Linne & Jern Man were 
multi–industry conglomerates, so the comparison is a bit artificial for these companies 
with wide interest in many industries. It is also noteworthy that an average index built 
from the price quotes of these stocks is eerily similar with the total return index by 
Vaihekoski and Nyberg, illuminating the fact the largest companies dominated index 
performance.  
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Chart 12. Different Industries: Different Stories 1937–1947 
Monthly nominal average indexes, August 1939=100 
 
Source: Vaihekoski. Index averages calculated by the author based on data by Vaihekoski. 
 
Chart 13. Monthly P/E Ratios of Different Industries 1937–1947 
 
P/E ratios for above mentioned indexes. The spike of 1940 for forest industry is because of reduced 
earnings for Kymmene stam, hence sky high P/E affecting the average. The speculative hausse of 1945 
can clearly be seen here as well, but banking stocks did not receive the same attention and spiked with 
multiples around 30 times their earnings, compared to bubblish over 100 for forest industry. Authors 
calculation based on authors collection of earnings and bid prices by Vaihekoski. 
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The main observation from this comparison is the banking industry lack of comparative 
performance. Banks generate earnings by lending money and enjoying interest from 
those loans. As lending was affected by the war and inflation ate the real value of all 
assets denominated in the Finnish marks, it is not surprising that this sector was utterly 
devastated by the war and vice versa: the industrial companies fared much better, 
especially industrial companies Wärtsilä, Nokia and Finska Gummifabriks. Tiderman 
formulates that “it was natural that the stock prices surge was present in industrial 
stocks, but bank companies followed the suit as well”, possibly reflecting this same line 
of thought.165  
 
Industrial companies were much pricier when measuring them with P/E ratios as the 
chart 13 shows. For industrial companies, the average P/E for the period was 25 against 
the average of “only” 18 for banking stocks. Banking stocks were also left with P/E:s 
around 9 to 10 by 1947, compared to P/E:s well above 20’s for industrial stocks. Asset 
rich forest companies had an average P/E of 34 during this period, but some amount of 
the high P/E can be attributed to temporarily reduced earnings of Kymmene stam in 
1940, elevating the average. 
 
 5.6. The Aftermath.  
 
The period 1937–1947 was a catastrophe for those who held positions in Finnish 
equities, yet those who kept their money under pillows lost certainly almost everything 
within the galloping inflation environment. Overall decline in the stock market was  
-60% in real terms during the time–period, translating into annual returns of -9,22%. 
Banking stocks fared even worse with -89% returns in real terms.166 Banks such as 
Fastighetsbanken and Handtverk. Aktiebank went bust with catastrophic loan and asset 
losses in the lost Karelia and the devastated Lapland.167 Industrial stocks fared better 
probably because of “real” substance, or assets, in their balance sheet: machines, 
production facilities, ships, inventories etc. Banking stocks equity is mainly composed 
                                                 
165 Tiderman 1962, p. 16.  
166 As calculated from the UNITAS indexes. See explanations for indexes above.  
167 Kantanen 2012, p. 81. For Fastighetsbanken see http://www.porssitieto.fi/1912s.html, 
accessed 21.1.2017.  
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of cash or short term investments to bonds; was not a good store of value because of 
high inflation environment destroying the value of monetary goods.168  
 
As in the French experience (see below), the most destructive element to real returns 
was high inflation, caused by gargantuan expansion of money supply when the war was 
financed with debt monetizing by the Bank of Finland. State budget was covered with 
tax or other income by little over 50% in 1941 and 1944 and 70% 1942–44. Public debt 
grew over nine–fold, deflated with whole–sale–price index, from 1938 to 1944. The 
number of banknotes grew more than seven–fold during the same timeframe.169 In 
nominal terms HSE held still three times the value that it had at the end of August 1939, 
the high–point for many stocks. But in real terms, the years 1945–1947 were 
devastating as nominally index traded in side move but as whole sale prices rose almost 
three–fold 1945–1947 the real return was -47% on top of one–quarter loss occurred 
during 1939–1944. Overall, these years were depressive years for investors. For the 
stock market, the lost war coupled with massive inflation and political uncertainty 
during “danger years” 1944–48 was devastating in terms of real returns. Stjernschantz 
notes that “political events and market swings” went hand in hand and in 1947 stocks 
slipped for a moment when the government turned down the Marshall aid from the 
USA. On the other hand, investments into real economy needed more capital and pulled 
liquidity out of stock market and the same time the use of margin was suppressed.170 
Stock multiples plunged as well. After the speculative bubble of 1945, the P/E multiple 
stayed in mid 20’s for 1946 but decreased to around 17 times earnings in 1947, still not 
“cheap” compared to long term averages but 15% less than the average of 20.4 during 
1937–1947.  To echo Le Bris remarks, the war followed by defeat is arguably the 
worst–case scenario for stock market.171 
 
 
 
                                                 
168 For the demise of bank stock investors, banking stocks were still down in 1956 in real terms, 
representing around on tenth the value they had before the war. See Palmgren 1958, p. 54. 
169 Pihkala 1982, p. 325.  
170 Stjernschantz 1987, p. 85–86.  
171 Le Bris 2012, p. 1.  
 59 
5.7. Comparing indexes: the Finnish stock market bites the dust.  
 
Next this paper compares differences in real returns of equities in Finland, Germany, 
France, U.S.A., U.K., Denmark and Sweden, see chart 14. Sweden is included as a non–
belligerent country to compare returns between fighting and non–fighting states. All 
indexes are adjusted with whole–sale–prices to grasp the value–erasing nature of 
inflation.172 All the data is from Global Financial data base, except the French data is 
from Global Financial Data only until 1938 and 1939–1946 from Le Bris.173 The 
Finnish stock market delivered the second worst returns in time frame +-8 years, when 
1939 is put as the base year, with returns of -46% in real terms by 1946. U.K. equities, 
were the “best” investment being the only market that did not deliver negative returns 
but almost doubled their real value during the war.174 As mentioned above, the German 
stock market basically ceased to work efficiently in 1940 and data after that is flawed; 
in real terms the worth of equities would have been close to zero175 and is not very well 
illustrated in the chart. Curiously, the chart shows that the German stock market 
recovered from the lows of the Great Depression, delivering returns of +85% from 1932 
to 1940. From an investor point of view, the rise of Hitler was not taken only as a 
negative event, it can be observed. 
 
The most significant price movements can be seen in the French stock market. Stocks 
experienced a bear market, sliding till the year 1940 from 1932. France experienced 
extended recession and political turmoil in the 1930’s.176 Stock market high was in 1942 
after a similar flight–to–safety effect as in the Finnish case: savers tried to protect their 
money from diminishing purchasing power. After that, accelerating inflation and 
decreasing market led to highly negative real returns and stocks decreased -69% by 
1946 compared to 1939. The chart illustrates well that Swedish or U.K. equities did not 
experience a severe post–war slump. They did not experience fighting in their own 
ground or bombing raids excluding the U.K. that would have caused disruption in 
production and other economic life.  
                                                 
172 See a similar comparison, though in dollar terms, in Ferguson 2008, p. 440. 
173 See Le Bris 2012. Le Bris data is more recent, therefore preferred over the data of GFD. 
174 Ferguson 2008, p. 465.  
175 Ferguson 2008, p. 39–41. 
176 Sayvy 1969, p. 21–35. 
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Chart 14. The Stock Markets in Selected Countries 1937–1947 
Adjusted with whole–sale–price indexes, 1939=100 
 
Source: Global Financial Data and for the French market after 1939 Le Bris 2012. 
 
Finland, Germany and France experienced destruction of industrial capacity or other 
negative effects in their economic structures. Their currencies deteriorated and inflation 
ran rampage. After the war the Finnish Markka was devalued multiple times because of 
risen price levels, thus sharply decreasing the value of financial assets nominated in 
Finnish markka.177 The above mentioned Le Bris found that in the French case, the way 
how the war was financed had profound effects on real returns in equity markets.178 
This is seen in a larger context here: as in France, both Germany and Finland used 
excessive debt monetizing during the war. Inflation in Sweden and United States was 
not high: for the period 1939–1945 it was on average 6.13% and 3.88% annually 
compared to 25.74% in France and 28.8% in Finland, respectively.179 Germany’s 
                                                 
177 Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012 p. 59–82. 
178 Le Bris 2012, 22–23. 
179 Numbers calculated using Global Financial Data. 
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inflation data is not usable in this period due to strict price controls. Interestingly, the 
stock market in the occupied Denmark fared better than the U.S. market. It is interesting 
that the victors USA stock market performed poorly in real terms. Stocks were in the 
same point in real terms where they had been in 1939 when the war ended and after the 
war they slumped because of fear of similar depression that occurred after the First 
World War. This nevertheless considering the fact that businesses were benefited by the 
war in the USA.180 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The stock market in Helsinki was almost vaporized after the World War II. Inflation ran 
rampage, destroying the real value of money saved in stocks while the stock indexes 
remained volatile but basically in the same level after the war. The bourse was down 
only 23% in real terms by the end of September 1944 compared to end of August 1939 
when Germany invaded Poland. But the after–war inflation quickly diminished the real 
value of stock holdings that in the end went to 37% at the end of 1947 compared to the 
heights of summer 1939. Industrial companies fared much better than banks that lost 
eventually almost 90% of their real value during this turbulent period. 
 
The stock market experienced two bull markets that stretched valuations. The anecdotal 
evidence presented in the beginning of this paper is confirmed with statistical evidence 
comprised of company net earnings and high price–to–earnings derived from them. The 
hausse of 1940–1942 stopped when P/E:s expanded to almost 30, on average. The 
combination of high valuation, deteriorating prospects for Axis victory and increased 
supply of shares via forced listings stopped the stock market from climbing more. The 
bubble of 1945 was even more extreme when many companies, especially industrials, 
traded with P/E:s of 30 to 108, average being over 50 times their earnings. This boom 
ended in bust as well when stocks slipped to same levels by December they commanded 
back in January 1945.  
 
                                                 
180 For U.S. Corporations in World War 2, see Herman 2012. 
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How about the question of the stock market anticipation of the coming crisis? While it 
is clear no market participant nor commentator could forecast how severe and long the 
Second World War would become, evidence represented in this paper points out that the 
Finnish stock market was discounting an ever increasing possibility of war after the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop–pact at the end of August and reacted vigorously to German 
hostile march to Poland. The Finnish mobilization of reserves at the beginning of 
October was also greeted with a stock market slide, signalling nervousness among 
market participants. The stock market was down approximately 20% since the 
Molotov–Ribbentrop–pact when the Soviets started to pour in crossing the Russo–
Finnish border.  
 
The stock market rose again after the Winter war, but especially for the movements 
after 1941, it is increasingly difficult to tell whether the stock market reflected the 
change of fortunes in war, or rather it was performing an increasing safe–haven function 
for investors shielding themselves from negative effects of inflation. The stock market 
depreciated by almost 7% during June 1944, reflecting the precarious situation Finland 
faced in the geopolitical landscape after the Soviet offensive in Karelian Isthmus. 
Finland was eventually knocked out of the war, but she successfully warded off the 
Soviet advance to the Finnish mainland. After the armistice signed in September 1944, 
political situation remained dangerous and rising inflation effectively all but wiped out 
the Finnish investors.  
 
To sum up, the stock market reveals two important aspects about the expectations of 
contemporaries: first, the stock market evidently reacted to the increased threat of war 
and was expecting Finnish involvement in a way or another since the end of August 
1939. Second, after 1941 it mostly functioned as a safe–haven and thirdly, cheap credit 
fuelled occasional speculative hausses of 1942 and 1945. 
 
Comparing to other stock markets during the time period, the Finnish stock market 
relates to ones in Germany and France. Especially Germany experienced physical 
destruction so epic and calamitous in scale that stock market went de facto to zero. The 
French story shares similar characteristics with the Finnish one. Monetizing debt and 
financing of war with printed money led to high inflation that, together with destruction 
and effects of war economy, greatly diminished the money value and importance of the 
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stock market in the French economy. Helsinki stock exchange was diminished to a 
similar, greatly diminished role and it took until the 1980’s that the turbulent period of 
the 1930’s and 40’s was left behind.  
 
The case of the Finnish stock market certainly speaks volumes for the argument that 
war, particularly a lost one, is the most dreadful scenario an investor can face. 
Especially banks, always vulnerable to shocks, monetary instability and 
unpredictability, were hit hard by this turbulent sequence of events. But historical 
events never repeat themselves in a similar fashion. Contemporary investors must gauge 
the effect of new geopolitical crises on their portfolios by looking forward, but 
historical evidence on this part gives investors some confirmation that owning securities 
in the possible to–be–defeated side’s bourse can be a dangerous adventure to make 
trough. 
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Appendix 
  
1. Corrected Number of Shares and Share Capital in Certain Companies 
 
There were certain differences in the share data regarding the number of shares received from 
Vaihekoski. Differences affected only a handful of companies and was probably caused by different data 
sources as Nyberg and Vaihekoski used the so–called Iron Book where nominal values and share capital 
was also listed. They did not include preferred shares into share count and the same procedure is used in 
this paper as well.181 These tables list the share counts used in this study to calculate earnings per share, 
share capital and market values. 
 
Table 1. Arabia number of shares 
Year No. of Shares Nominal Value Share Capital 
1936 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1937 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1938 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1939 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1940 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1941 64 000 500 32 000 000 
1942 80 000 500 40 000 000 
1943 120 000* 500 60 000 000 
1944 120 000* 500 60 000 000 
1945 200 000* 500 100 000 000 
1946 226 340* 500 113 170 000 
1947 339 510* 500 169 755 000 
Arabia. *The number of shares corrected by dividing Share Capital, taken from Firmor i Finland and 
Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt Yearbooks, with the nominal value of shares. The nominal value was 500 
FIM in Vaihekoski data and Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt yearbooks. 
 
Table 2. Enso–Gutzeit number of shares. 
Year No. of Shares Nominal 
Value 
Share Capital 
                                                 
181 See Nyberg and Vaihekoski 2009, p. 11–12.  
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1936  540 000   500   270 000 000  
1937  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1938  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1939  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1940  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1941  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1942  648 000   500   324 000 000  
1943  810 000*   500   405 000 000  
1944  810 000*   500   405 000 000  
1945  810 000*   500   405 000 000  
1946  855 980*   500   427 990 000  
1947  854 682*   500   427 341 000  
Enso–Gutzeit. *Share Capital taken from and Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt Yearbooks and divided with 
the nominal value of the share.  
 
Table 3. Other Companies 
Year(s) Company No. Of 
Shares 
Nominal Value Share Capital 
1947  Ferraria   40 000   500   20 000 000  
1947 Finska Gummifabriks AB  589 640   500   294 820 000  
1936–1940 G. A. Serlachius  50 000   1 000   50 000 000  
1947 Kaukas Fabrik  13 448   20 000   268 960 000  
1947 Kymmene Stam  353 305   2 000   706 611 000  
1947 Pargas Kalkbergs  2 469 905   100   246 990 500  
1947 Stockmann  73 102   2 000   146 204 000  
1936 Tammerfors Linne & Jern Man  68 000   2 000   136 000 000  
1937 Tammerfors Linne & Jern Man  70 000   2 000   140 000 000  
1947 Suomen Sokeri  601 745   600   361 047 000  
1947 J. Stenbergs Maskinfabrik  10 776   2 000  21 552 000 
*Corrected using data observed in Suomen Pankit ja Osakeyhtiöt yearbooks and Firmor i Finland 
yearbooks. 
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2. The HSE Total Earnings, Billions Old FIM 
 
Year HSE Earnings by year end, 
billions old FIM 
1936 0.356 
1937 0.419 
1938 0.415 
1939 0.373 
1940 0.349 
1941 0.397 
1942 0.523 
1943 0.783 
1944 0.645 
1945 0.800 
1946 0.883 
1947 1.415 
Source: author calculations based on primary sources.  
 
 
  
